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Abstract
Elliptic curves are the basis for a relative new class of public-key schemes. It is
predicted that elliptic curves will replace many existing schemes in the near future.
It is thus of great interest to develop algorithms which allow ecient implementations
of elliptic curve crypto systems. This thesis deals with such algorithms.
Ecient algorithms for elliptic curves can be classied into low-level algo-
rithms, which deal with arithmetic in the underlying nite eld and high-level al-
gorithms, which operate with the group operation. This thesis describes three new
algorithms for ecient implementations of elliptic curve cryptosystems. The rst algo-
rithm describes the application of the Karatsuba-Ofman Algorithm to multiplication
in composite elds GF ((2n)m). The second algorithm deals with ecient inversion
in composite Galois elds of the form GF ((2n)m). The third algorithm is an entirely
new approach which accelerates the multiplication of points which is the core op-
eration in elliptic curve public-key systems. The algorithm explores computational
advantages by computing repeated point doublings directly through closed formulae
rather than from individual point doublings. Finally we apply all three algorithms to
an implementation of an elliptic curve system over GF ((216)11). We provide absolute
performance measures for the eld operations and for an entire point multiplication.
We also show the improvements gained by the new point multiplication algorithm in
conjunction with the k-ary and improved k-ary methods for exponentiation.
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Introduction
1.1 Motivation
In 1976, Die and Hellman revolutionized the eld of cryptography with the invention
of public-key cryptography [DH76]. Soon after, RSA, the rst usable public key
cryptosystem, was introduced [RSA78]. This particular cryptosystem is based on
the diculty of factoring very large numbers and today, it is still the most widely
used public-key cryptosystem in the world. Since then, in the eld of computational
number theory, major work has been done towards ecient integer factorization. As
a consequence, new types of public-key algorithms have arisen. The most important
competitors to RSA are schemes based on the Discrete Logarithm (DL) problem.
Originally, the DL problem was considered in the multiplicative group of a nite
eld, especially a prime eld or a eld of characteristic 2, since these elds seemed
most appropriate for implementations. Then in 1985, a variant of the DL problem
was proposed by Miller [Mil86] and Koblitz [Kob87], based on the group of points of
an elliptic curve (EC) over a nite eld.
1
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A main feature that makes elliptic curves attractive is the relatively short
operand length. Cryptosystems which explore the DL problem over elliptic curves
can be built with an operand length of 140{200 bits [Men93b] as compared to RSA
and systems based on the DL in nite elds both of which require operands of 512{
1024 bits. Other advantages are the large numbers of curves available to provide the
groups and the absence of sub-exponential time algorithms (such us the index calculus
method) to attack cryptosystems in these groups. The latter property provides a very
good long-term security against current attacks. In addition, IEEE [KMQV96] and
other standard bodies such as ANSI and ISO are in the process of standardizing elliptic
curve cryptosystems. It is important to point out that elliptic curves can provide
various security services such as key exchange, privacy through encryption,and sender
authentication and message integrity through digital signatures. For these reasons it
is expected that elliptic curves will become very popular for many information security
applications in the near future. It is thus very attractive to provide algorithms which
allow for ecient implementations of elliptic curve cryptosystems. This thesis will
deal with such algorithms.
Ecient algorithms for elliptic curves can be classied into high-level algo-
rithms, which operate with the group operation, and into low-level algorithms, which
deal with arithmetic in the underlying nite eld. For ecient implementations it is
obviously the best to optimize both types of algorithms. The main part of the thesis
will introduce three algorithms, one high-level algorithm for point multiplication and
two low-level for nite eld inversion and multiplication, respectively.
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1.2 Thesis Outline
Chapter 2 gives an elementary introduction to composite Galois Fields and elliptic
curves. It covers some of the mathematical theory behind the construction of com-
posite elds and the basic equations that will govern the addition and doubling of
elliptic curve points. Finally, it introduces the basic method used to compute the
multiple of a point and the notation that will be used throughout this thesis to refer
to composite elds and elliptic curves.
Chapter 3 presents the approach that we used to implement in software addi-
tion, multiplication, and inversion over Galois Fields. We also introduce the concept
of the Table Look-Up (TLU) which will be fundamental to the discussions about
algorithm complexity in Chapter 5 and the basic data structure used to represent
elliptic curve points.
Chapter 4 summarizes previous works on elliptic curve cryptosystems pre-
sented in the research community in the past. We will introduce some of the pre-
vious elliptic curve implementations found in the literature, both over GF (2k) and
GF ((2n)m). We will also summarize the work in each of following areas: ecient
inversion and ecient multiplication algorithms for arithmetic in GF ((2n)m) and el-
liptic curve point addition algorithms. Finally, we will present some of the improved
algorithms used to compute the product of an elliptic curve point by a large integer.
Chapter 5 provides a detailed treatment of the Karatsuba-Ofman algorithm
(KOA) applied to eld multiplication inGF ((2n)m). We provide a complexity analysis
of the KOA for software implementations where arithmetic in the subeld GF (2n) is
based on table look-up.
Chapter 6 shows an algorithm for eciently computing the inverse of an el-
ement in the composite Galois eld GF ((2n)m) = GF (2k). The algorithm is based
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on an idea by Itoh and Tsujii [IT88], but is optimized for a standard base repre-
sentation and for binary eld polynomials. The algorithm reduces inversion in the
composite eld to inversion in the subeld GF (2n). Unlike the inversion algorithms
in [SOOS95, WBV+96], the inversion algorithm is based on Fermat’s little theorem.
Chapter 7 introduces an entirely new approach for accelerating the multipli-
cation of points on an elliptic curve. The approach works in conjunction with the
k-ary and the sliding window methods. The method is applicable to elliptic curves
over any eld, but we provide worked-out formulae for elliptic curves over elds of
characteristic two. In addition, we show the actual performance of the newly intro-
duced algorithm and the ones treated in Chapters 5 and 6 in an implementation of
an elliptic curve cryptosystem over GF (2176) = GF ((216)11). We provide absolute
timing measurements for an entire elliptic curve multiplication as well as timings for
individual operations.
Chapter 8 describes an elliptic curve algorithm analog to the Die-Hellman
key exchange protocol [DH76], as well a systems analog to the ElGamal cryptosys-
tem [ElG85]. In addition, a draft of the proposed IEEE Standard for elliptic curve
cryptosystems will be introduced. Timing estimates for several of these systems will
be provided.
Finally, Chapter 9 will discuss the results of this research. It will also provide
the reader with recommendations for further research in the general area of algorithm
optimization for elliptic curves.
Chapter 2
Background
This chapter introduces elliptic curves and composite Galois elds over GF ((2n)m)
and the notation that will be used throughout this thesis to refer to them. We
also present the formulae used to add elliptic curve points for curves over elds of
characteristic two. Finally, we introduce an algorithm used to eciently compute a
multiple of an elliptic curve point.
2.1 Galois Fields GF ((2n)m)
2.1.1 Polynomial Rings and Fields
It is known that the set of integers modulo q, where q is a prime, forms a eld, where
a eld is as dened in [LC83]. This eld is denoted as Zq . One can also dene Zq [x] to
be the set of all polynomials with coecients from Zq in the indeterminate x. Then,
one can construct the ring of polynomials modulo q by combining the set Zq[x] with
the operations of addition and multiplication of polynomials (as dened in the usual
way) and reducing the coecients modulo q [LN83].
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A second ring can be constructed in a similar manner. This time, we will
construct the ring of polynomials modulo f(x), where f(x) 2 Zq[x] and deg(f(x)) =
m  1. This ring is denoted by Zq[x]=f(x). The elements of the ring are all those
polynomials in Zq[x] with degree less or equal to m− 1. Addition and multiplication
are dened as in the case of Zq[x] followed by a reduction modulo f(x). It turns out
that if f(x) is irreducible, GF (qm) = Zq [x]=f(x), is a nite eld [LC83]. In addition,
it has been shown that an irreducible polynomial of degree m over GF (q) exist for
any nite eld GF (q). In the rest of this thesis the notation GF (qm) will be used
when referring to nite elds.
Notice that GF (qm) is also referred to as an \extension eld of GF (q)" and it
has order qm. The eld GF (q) is then referred to as the \ground eld" or \subeld"
of GF (qm) [McE87]. Finally, every element in GF (qm) can be represented as a poly-
nomial A(x) = am−1xm−1 +   + a0 with coecients ai 2 GF (q); i = 0; 1;    ;m− 1.
A(x) is said to be \a polynomial over GF (q)." These qm polynomials in GF (qm) form
the residue classes modulo f(x) of all polynomials over GF (q).
2.1.2 Composite Fields
In this section we will introduce a special type of nite elds, called composite elds,
which will prove to be an essential concept in the development of this thesis.
In Section 2.1.1, it was assumed that q was a prime when constructing a nite
eld. In fact, q does not need to be a prime. The order of a eld only needs to be
a power of a prime or q = pm where p is prime. In particular, we can build further
extensions on extension elds. For instance, the eld GF (qn) can be extended to
GF ((qn)m). Notice that in practical applications (hardware or software) where nite
eld arithmetic needs to be implemented, the choice of q = 2 is very benecial because
of the way in which information is represented inside computers. Thus, we dene a
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special type of nite elds.
Denition 1 We call two pairs fGF (2n); Q(y) = yn+Pn−1i=0 qiyig and fGF ((2n)m); P (x) =
xm +
Pm−1
i=0 pix
ig a composite eld if
 GF (2n) is constructed as an extension eld of GF (2) by Q(y),
 GF ((2n)m) is constructed as extension eld of GF (2n) by P (x).
where Q(y) is an irreducible polynomial over GF (2) and P (x) is also irreducible over
GF (2). In the rest of this thesis composite elds will be denoted by GF ((2n)m).
It is important to point out that from a mathematical point of viewGF ((2n)m)
is isomorphic to GF (2k) for nm = k [LN83]. However, although a eld of order 2nm
and one of order 2k are isomorphic, their algorithmic complexity is dierent with
respect to the eld operations addition and multiplication and, in general, it will
depend on the choice of m and n and more specically on the polynomials Q(y) and
P (x) [Paa94].
2.1.3 Choosing the Field Polynomial P (x)
As stated above, the polynomials Q(y) and P (x) are of great importance in determin-
ing the algorithmic complexity of arithmetic in the eld GF ((2n)m). In this section
we will explore a way to choose eld polynomials that we will provide us with certain
algorithmic advantages.
The polynomial P (x) generates the eld GF ((2n)m) and it is very important in
reducing the complexity of the basic operations in the Galois eldGF ((2n)m). [Jun93]
showed that if gcd(n;m) = 1 then every P (x) of degree m which is irreducible over
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GF (2), is also irreducible over GF (2n). Therefore, one can choose n and m to be
relatively prime and then choose P (x) in such a way that it only has binary coecients
as opposed to coecients from GF (2n). Furthermore, one should try to choose an
irreducible polynomial P (x) with the least number of coecients, thus minimizing
the complexity of modular arithmetic in the Galois eld.
2.2 Non-Supersingular Elliptic Curves over Fields
of Characteristic Two
In this section, we dene elliptic curves and give general equations that describe them.
The section is meant to be a condensed summary that introduces the reader to the
concept of the elliptic curve. For a more extensive treatment referred to [Men93b].
We then specialize to the case of elliptic curves over nite elds of characteristic 2.
Finally, we dene the group law for this curves and analyze the complexity of these
equations.
2.2.1 Background on Elliptic Curves
Let K be a eld with characteristic char(K). An elliptic curve over K, denoted by E,
is the set of points (X, Y, Z), which satisfy a generalized smooth Weierstrass equation:
E : Y 2Z + a1XY Z + a3Y Z
2 = X3 + a2X
2Z + a4XZ
2 + a6Z
3 (2.1)
where a1; :::; a6 2 K (K is a xed algebraic closure of K) and smooth refers to the
fact that for all points (X,Y,Z)2 P 2(K) satisfying,
F (X; Y; Z) = Y 2Z + a1XY Z + a3Y Z
2 −X3 − a2X2Z − a4XZ2 − a6Z3 = 0
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at least one of the three partial derivatives @F
@X
, @F
@Y
, and @F
@Z
is non-zero at P . There
is exactly one point in E with Z-coordinate equal to 0, that is (0,1,0). We call this
point the point at innity and denote it by O.
To obtain an equation in non-homogeneous coordinates, we can let x = X=Z
and y = Y=Z, and together with the special point O, we get [Kaz92] :
E : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x+ a6 (2.2)
Thus, an elliptic curveE dened over a nite eldK is the set of solutions (x; y) 2 K2
which satises (2.2) together with the point of innity O.
Elliptic curves can be simplied over elds of dierent characteristics by means
of coordinate transformation. However, in the rest of this thesis, we will be only
concerned with curves of characteristic 2. One can distinguish between two types of
curves in this case:
 Singular elliptic curves with char(K)=2, where E is dened as
y2 + ay = x3 + bx+ c
and,
 Non-supersingular elliptic curves with char(K)=2, where E is dened as
y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + c:
It is important to point out that an elliptic curve is said to be supersingular if
and only if the j−invariant of E is not equal to zero, otherwise it is non-supersingular
[Men93a].
As a result of the MOV reduction attack [MOV93], which only applies to
supersingular elliptic curves, the security of systems based on the two classes of curves
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dier radically. The MOV attack leads to sub-exponential attacks (index-calculus
method) against supersingular elliptic curves, whereas the best known attacks against
non-supersingular elliptic curves have an exponential complexity. It is important to
point out that supersingular elliptic curves should be avoided when implementing
cryptosystems based on elliptic curves. Moreover, the use of non-supersingular curves
in public-key cryptography can provide far more security per bit ratio than existing
systems such as RSA [AMV93], therefore they will be the only ones studied in this
thesis.
2.2.2 Elliptic Curves over Fields of Characteristic Two in
Ane Coordinates
In the remainder of this report we will study optimum ways to implement non-
supersingular elliptic curves over GF (2k). Thus, we dene an elliptic curve in this
context as:
y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + c (2.3)
where a; c 2 GF (2k); c 6= 0, together with the point at innity O [AMV93].
The addition operation for an elliptic curve E (2.3) is dened as follows. Let
P = (x1; y1) 2 E; then −P = (x1; y1 + x1). P + O = O + P = P for all P 2 E. If
Q = (x2; y2) 2 E and Q 6= −P , then P +Q = (x3; y3), where
x3 =
8>><>>:
2 + + x1 + x2 + a P 6= Q
2 + + a P = Q
(2.4)
and
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y3 =
8>><>>:
(x1 + x3) + x3 + y1 P 6= Q
x21 + x3 + x3 P = Q
(2.5)
where
 =
8>><>>:
y1+y2
x1+x2
P 6= Q
x1 +
y1
x1
P = Q
(2.6)
From (2.4) and (2.5) the addition of two dierent elliptic curve points, i.e.,
P 6= Q, requires the following eld operations:
 8 Additions
 1 Squaring
 2 Multiplications
 1 Inverse
On the other hand, the doubling of an elliptic curve point, i.e., P = Q, using
(2.4) and (2.5) requires the following eld operations:
 5 Additions
 2 Squarings
 2 Multiplications
 1 Inverse
From the discussion in Section 3.1, we know that both multiplication and
inversion are the time critical operations and therefore the need to minimize their
number when doing arithmetic with elliptic curves. Chapter 7 will introduce a new
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method of doubling elliptic curve points that minimizes the number of inversions at
the expense of more multiplications.
2.2.3 Multiples of Points
When implementing an elliptic curve cryptosystem, such as those described in Chap-
ter 8, one is required to compute
eP = P + P +   + P| {z }
e times
;
where e is a positive integer and P 2 E. For very large values of e, a straightforward
summation becomes impractical and so we use a method which is analogous to the
square and multiply algorithm for exponentiation [Knu81]. This method is known as
\repeated double and add" and it is described in Theorem 1 [MQV95].
Theorem 1 Let P 2 E and e = (etet−1    e1e0)2 be the binary representation of the
multiplier e where the most signicant bit et of e is 1. Then, Q = eP can be computed
using the following algorithm.
Algorithm (Input: P = (x; y); e; Output: Q = eP )
1. Q P
2. For i = t− 1 to 0
2.1 Q Q+Q
2.2 If ei = 1, then Q Q+ P
4. Return(Q)
Theorem 1 implies that for a randomly selected integer e with t + 1 bits,
one needs t doubling steps and an average t=2 adding steps. Notice, however, that
improved methods for exponentiation have been suggested. Some of them will be
explored in Chapters 4 and 7.
Chapter 3
Computer Arithmetic in
Composite Fields and Elliptic
Curves
This chapter introduces the way in which we represent Galois eld elements in software
implementations. We also present the algorithms used to implement in software
addition, multiplication, and inversion over Galois elds. Finally, we introduce the
concept of the Table Look-Up (TLU) which will be fundamental to the discussions
about algorithmic complexity in Chapter 5.
3.1 Computer Representation of Galois Field Ele-
ments
When optimizing Galois eld arithmetic, it is necessary to have a good understanding
of the internal representation of the Galois eld elements in the computer. The
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software implementation that was used in realizing this work used three dierent
libraries to deal with Galois elds GF ((2n)m) [HPR].
3.1.1 Composite Field Libraries
The rst library implemented, called gfopsn.c, denes the type gfelt which is used
to deal with elements of the ground eldGF (2n), where n  32. Notice that these eld
elements are represented by integer variables. The eld polynomialQ(y) is determined
by the user. The second library is called polyopsn.c. This library denes the type
gfpoly to perform dierent arithmetic operations with polynomials over GF (2n).
The gfpoly type was dened as an array of gfelt elements. The elements of the
array gfpoly signify the coecients of the polynomial. The coecient of xi, is stored
at position i+2. Position 0 of the array is reserved for an integer indicating the
degree of the polynomials, whereas position 1 of the array is reserved for an integer
indicating the number of memory cells allocated. It is important to point out that
the polynomials themselves are not elements of GF (2n), but rather the coecients of
the polynomials.
The last library corresponds to the le cgfops.c. In this library the type
comp was dened to deal with composite eld elements or elements of the Galois
eld GF ((2n)m). Notice that this new type was dened the same as the gfpoly type
but the elements of this eld are constructed from the polynomial P (x). Thus, if
A(x) 2 GF ((2n)m), we can represent it as follows:
A(x) = am−1xm−1 + am−2xm−2   + a1x+ a0; ai 2 GF (2n) (3.1)
Furthermore, the polynomial A(x) is represented as an array of gfelts (am−1    a1a0)
of lengthm+2 (m entries for m coecients plus two entries for the degree and the total
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size of the array, as described above). Notice that cgfops.c allows eld arithmetic
in GF ((2n)m), by performing polynomial arithmetic modulo P (x).
3.1.2 Application to GF ((216)11)
In this section, we consider the special case of the Galois Field GF ((216)11). Notice
that gcd(16; 11) = 1 thus, if we choose a polynomial of degree 11 which is irreducible
over GF (2), it will also be irreducible over GF (216).
In order to construct the eld GF ((216)11), we need to choose irreducible
polynomials for both the ground eld GF (216) and the composite eld GF ((216)11).
From [LN83], we chose Q(y) = y16 + y11 + y6 + y5 + 1 and P (x) = x11 + x2 + 1.
It is important to point out that because P (x) is a trinomial, the complexity of
the modular reduction will be minimal as opposed to choosing a P (x) with more
coecients.
From Section 3.1, we know that an element A(x) = a10x10 +a9x9   +a1x+a0,
ai 2 GF (216), of the composite eld GF ((216)11) will be represented by an integer
array with 11 entries, each entry being an element of type gfelt representing a
coecient ai of the polynomial A(x). Each coecient ai in turn is represented as a
16-bit integer variable.
3.2 Computer Arithmetic in Composite Fields
This section introduces the concept of the table look-up as it applies to arithmetic
in composite elds. In addition, it describes in a more detailed manner the type of
arithmetic operations that are dened in some of the libraries that were introduced
in Section 3.1 and the way these libraries are implemented in software.
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3.2.1 Multiplication in GF (2n)
The major advantage of using composite Galois elds is that most of the time con-
suming operations in the ground eld, such as inversion and multiplication, can be
accelerated using table look-up (TLU) [Bea96, WBV+96]. Table look-ups are based
on the idea of precomputing \log" and \antilog" tables in the ground eld GF (2n).
By log, one means the analog of the logarithm function in a discrete sense. In other
words, given that all non-zero elements of GF (2n) can be represented as the power
of a primitive element !, we dene the log function as follows:
k = log(!k); !k 2 GF (2n); k 2 f1; 2;    ; 2n − 1g (3.2)
where GF (2n) = f0; !; !2;    ; !2n−1 = 1g.
By antilog we mean the inverse of the log function. In other words, if the log
function is as dened in (3.2) then (3.3) denes the antilog function as follows:
!k = antilog(k) = antilog(log(!k)); !k 2 GF (2n); k 2 f1; 2;    ; 2n − 1g (3.3)
(3.2) and (3.3) will prove to be fundamental for ecient software implementations as
described in Chapter 6.
Finally, the product of two elements !i; !j 2 GF (2n) can be reduced to an
integer addition and three table look-ups as follows:
!i!j = antilog(log(!i) + log(!j)) (mod 2
n − 1) (3.4)
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3.2.2 Addition in GF ((2n)m)
Addition inGF ((2n)m) is performed by using a routine dened in the library polyopsn.c.
The function denition is polysum(A, B, *X) where A, B, and *X are all of type
gfpoly or, in other words, polynomials with coecients in GF (2n). The same routine
is also called by cgfopsn.c to perform addition of composite eld elements. Compos-
ite eld addition, C(x) = A(x) + B(x); A(x); B(x); C(x) 2 GF ((2n)m), amounts to
adding the coecients of two composite eld elements in standard base representation
as follows
C(x) = (cm−1xm−1 +   + c1x+ c0) =
= (am−1xm−1 +   + a1x+ a0) + (bm−1xm−1 +   + b1x+ b0) (3.5)
where ai+bi = ci 2 GF (2n) and C(x) 2 GF ((2n)m). This operation can be performed
by bitwise XORing of the coecients of the polynomials. Notice that one only needs
a loop with m iterations which is fast.
3.2.3 Multiplication in GF ((2n)m)
The multiplication of two composite eld elements A(x); B(x) 2 GF ((2n)m) can be
performed in standard base representation as follows:
C(x) = A(x)B(x) mod P (x); (3.6)
where P (x) is the irreducible polynomial of the eld GF ((2n)m). The eld multipli-
cation can be performed in two steps:
1. Ordinary polynomial multiplication ()
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2. Reduction modulo the eld polynomial (mod).
Step 1 will be treated in detail in Chapter 5 where the Karatsuba-Ofman al-
gorithm is studied. The following will explain how the reduction modulo the eld
polynomial is performed. Notice that in both steps, the basic arithmetic operations,
addition and multiplication of polynomials, are performed in the ground eld GF (2n).
As stated in previous sections, the additions are XOR operations and the multiplica-
tions are table look-ups as shown in Section 3.2.1.
In order to perform modular reduction in GF ((2n)m) we will consider the
intermediate product C 0(x) = A(x)B(x). C 0(x) is a polynomial over GF (2n) with
deg(C 0(x))  2m − 2 with coecients c0i 2 GF (2n). Then, we can represent C(x)
where deg(C(x))  m− 1 as follows:
C(x) = C 0(x) mod P (x)
= c02m−2x
2m−2 +   + c00 mod P (x) (3.7)
= cm−1xm−1 +   + c0
The reduction modulo P (x) can be viewed as a linear mapping of the 2m− 1 coe-
cients of C 0(x) into the m coecients of C(x). This mapping can be represented in a
matrix notation as follows:
0BBBBBBBB@
d0
d1
...
dm−1
1CCCCCCCCA
=
0BBBBBBBB@
1 0    0 r0;0    r0;m−2
0 1    0 r1;0    r1;m−2
...
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0    1 rm−1;0    rm−1;m−2
1CCCCCCCCA
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
d00
...
d0m−1
d0m
...
d02m−2
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
: (3.8)
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The matrix on the right hand side of (3.8) consists of a m by m identity matrix
and a m by m − 1 reduction matrix, which is a function of the chosen monic eld
polynomial P (x) [Paa94]. If P (x) has only coecients from GF (2), the entries ri;j of
the reduction matrix are binary, allowing one to compute C(x) with only additions
in the ground eld.
3.2.4 Squaring in GF ((2n)m)
The squaring operation is a linear operation for composite elds of characteristic 2
as it is the case for GF ((2n)m). Thus, given A(x) 2 GF ((2n)m) as dened in (3.1),
A2(x) can be computed as follows [McE87]:
A2(x) = a2m−1x
2(m−1) + a2m−2x
2(m−2)    + a21x2 + a20 mod P (x) (3.9)
where the reduction modulo P (x) is performed as indicated in (3.8). Therefore, it is
easy to see that in performing the squaring operation one does not need to perform
most of the products that are computed in the multiplication of two general composite
eld elements, thus reducing the complexity of the squaring operation to m ground
eld multiplications. As in the case of general multiplication, only additions and
multiplications (done through table look-ups) of ground eld elements are required
in the squaring operation.
3.2.5 Inversion in GF ((2n)m)
The most costly operation in a software implementation that deals with Galois eld
arithmetic is inversion. Several algorithms have been proposed to accomplish this.
In Chapter 4 we introduce the so called \Almost Inverse Algorithm" proposed in
[SOOS95]. However, the method used in this implementation is based on a modied
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version of Itoh and Tsujii’s Algorithm for inversion in composite elds [Paa95]. This
algorithm is studied in detail in Chapter 6. For now, it suces to say that the idea
behind the algorithm is to reduce inversion in GF ((2n)m) to inversion in the ground
eld GF (2n) through the use of table look-ups.
3.2.6 Arithmetic in GF ((216)11)
Again, we consider the special case of the Galois eld GF ((216)11). Chapter 5 will
deal extensively with the multiplication of polynomials in this eld, and Chapter 6
will discuss an inversion algorithm. We will now describe how modulo reduction and
squarings are performed in this eld. From Section 3.2.3, we know that the modulo
reduction can be based on a matrix description. We chose P (x) to be the irreducible
polynomial x11 + x2 + 1. For the Galois eld GF ((216)11), the matrix in (3.8) is
entirely binary and is shown in Figure 3.1. Notice that computation of the matrix
vector product requires only 21 coecient additions in the ground eld GF (216).
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
co
c1
c2
c3
c4
c5
c6
c7
c8
c9
c10
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
=
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
c0o
c01
c02
c03
...
c010
c011
...
c018
c019
c020
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
Figure 3.1: Matrix for fast modulo reduction with P (x) = x11 + x2 + 1
We consider now the squaring operation in the eld GF ((216)11). In our imple-
mentation, given a composite eld elementA(x), where: A(x) = a10x10+: : :+a1x+a0,
ai 2 GF (2n), the squared element is: A2(x) = a210x20 + a29x18 +    + a21x2 + a20: We
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now can use a modied form of the reduction matrix given in Figure 3.1 to nd the
resulting coecients for A2(x). Thus, we are required to perform 22 table look-ups
and 6 additions in the subeld GF (216).
3.3 Computer Representation of Elliptic Curve El-
ements
As it was stated in Section 2.2.1, every point on an elliptic curve is described by the
coordinates (x; y). In our software implementation, a new data type was dened to
represent elliptic curve points. This new data type was called ellc elt, where:
typedef struct ellc_elt
{
comp pointx; /* Composite field element */
comp pointy; /* Composite field element */
int infinity; /* point of infinity = 1, else 0 */
} ellc_elt;
The coordinates x and y are represented by a composite eld element of type comp
(as dened in Section 3.1). In addition, the variable infinity will be used to indicate
whether the point at innity O has occurred.
Chapter 4
Previous Work
This chapter summarizes previous works on elliptic curve cryptosystems presented in
the research community in the past. We will introduce some of the previous elliptic
curve implementations found in the literature, both over GF (2k) and GF ((2n)m).
We will also summarize the work in each of following areas: ecient inversion and
ecient multiplication algorithms for arithmetic in GF ((2n)m) and elliptic curve
point addition algorithms. Finally, we will present some of the improved algorithms
used to compute the product of an elliptic curve point by a large integer.
4.1 Elliptic Curve Implementations over GF (2k)
4.1.1 Early work
The earliest references to the way in which elliptic curves are implemented are [MV90]
and [MV93]. In both references, the authors briefly discuss how arithmetic in GF (2k)
can be be eciently implemented in hardware. The selection of a curve and a nite
eld that minimizes the number of eld operations is treated as well as alternate
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ways to addition of points in an elliptic curve. Finally, the elliptic curve analog of
the ElGamal cryptosystem is analyzed and estimates for its throughput are given.
The underlying idea in [MV90] and [MV93] is to view the eld GF (2k) as a
k-dimensional vector space over GF (2) and dene a basis for it. Once the basis has
been dened, the elements of the nite eld GF (2k) can be conveniently represented
as 0{1 vectors of length k. Addition can be implemented by bitwise XORing the
vector representations which takes only a few clock cycles (Notice that it the ad-
dition operation will only take one cycle if the processor has word length equal to
k). [MV90] and [MV93] also introduce the idea of optimal normal basis for ecient
implementation of both squaring (one clock cycle to perform by shifting the vector
components)and multiplication (takes k clock cycles if optimal normal bases exist for
the eld, otherwise low-complexity normal basis should be considered). The Itoh and
Tsujii algorithm [IT88] is introduced as the most ecient technique to compute an
inverse based on Fermat’s Little Theorem. However, the algorithm is costly for hard-
ware implementations because it requires the storage of several intermediate steps
and therefore an alternate algorithm to perform inversion in a Galois eld is also
mentioned (see [ABMV93]).
In [MV90] and [MV93] supersingular elliptic curves were chosen to implement
the ElGamal cryptosystem because it is possible to avoid the inversion operation in
doubling a point if the coecients of the elliptic curve are carefully chosen. Never-
theless, the addition of two dierent points still requires the computation of inverses
in the underlying nite eld and these, despite the existence of ecient algorithms to
compute them, are by far the most costly operations to perform. Thus, [MV90] and
[MV93] introduce projective coordinates as a method of adding two dierent elliptic
curve points without resorting to the inverse operation. Using the repeated double
and add method described in Theorem 1, the product of a point P 2 E by an in-
teger e with Hw(e) = t + 1 will take 2t multiplications and t inversions using ane
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coordinates (Hw() denotes the Hamming weight of the binary representation of the
operand). On the other hand, if using projective coordinates and the same exponen-
tiation method the total operation count is reduced to 9t+ 2 multiplications and one
inversion. This reduction in inversions occurs at the expense of extra multiplications
and of space since one needs extra registers to store the intermediate results in the
algorithm.
[MV93]also provides throughput estimates for the encryption rate using the
elliptic curve analog of the ElGamal cryptosystem. A supersingular elliptic curve
E : y2 +y = x3+x+1 over GF (2239) was chosen. It was assumed that multiplication
took 239 cycles and inversion using the Itoh and Tsujii algorithm blog2(239 − 1)c +
Hw(239−1)−1 multiplications. Elements of the eld GF (2239) were represented using
optimal normal basis. Since the eld size is small, it was assumed that the number of
registers was not important and thus projective coordinates were chosen to represent
the points on the curve. Finally, the Hamming weight of the multiplier was limited
to 30 or less, thus increasing the speed of the system and putting an upper bound
on the time required for the encryption. With these assumptions and assuming a
40 MHz clock rate, 145 kbits/s is achieved. Notice that for this specic curve, the
computation of logarithms is believed to be as hard as for logarithms computed in
GF (24k) using the MOV attack thus, the index calculus method is infeasible with
current computer resources, but might be within reach in the near future..
Non-supersingular curves are also introduced. They are very attractive for
security reasons because the MOV attack can not be applied to them thus the size
of the underlying Galois eld can be smaller than for supersingular curves. As in
the case of the supersingular curves, the underlying eld should also have an optimal
normal basis in order to achieve ecient eld arithmetic and the need for the inverse
computation may be eliminated by resorting to projective coordinates.
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Finally, [MV93] mentions an implementation of a cryptosystem in hardware.
The implementation explored a chip explicitly designed to perform ecient elliptic
curve point addition over the eld GF (2155) and it will be the subject of Section 4.1.2.
4.1.2 Hardware Implementation over GF (2155) Using Normal
Basis Representation
[AMV93] discusses a VLSI implementation of an arithmetic processor in GF (2155)
which allows an ecient implementation of a non-supersingular elliptic curve cryp-
tosystem. Following the same approach as in [MV93] and [MV90], optimal normal
basis are chosen to perform arithmetic in the underlying eld GF (2155). Addition was
implemented by simply XORing the vector representations of the nite eld elements
in GF (2155). The normal base multiplier required three registers A, B, and C, where
C was the product register. The C register contained logic to interconnect the A
and B registers. In addition, the registers were directly interconnected to allow fast
register transfers. Since computations on elliptic curves were very I=O intensive, a
32-bit wide I=O structure was incorporated into the device which also allowed for 16-
and 8-bit transfers.
This architecture implied that each register was treated as ve individually
addressable 32-bit locations (5 padding bits were used in the high order bits) which
allowed to load or unload an entire register in 10 clock cycles or 250 nanoseconds. The
last optimization in the design was to use a simple instruction set, flexible enough to
allow the implementation of a variety of functions. The instruction set was divided
into two types: instructions for elementary register operations and instructions for
more involved eld operations.
It is important to point that [AMV93] were able to implement the coprocessor
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in a relatively small custom gate array by restricting its functionality to the minimum
necessary to implement the elliptic curve cryptosystem. The nal device required the
equivalent of about 11000 gates and ran at a 40 MHz clock rate, requiring less than
15 percent of the area of currently available smart card chips.
As in [MV93] and [MV90], projective coordinates were used to implement point
addition thus avoiding the inverse operation. Addition of two dierent points in a
non-supersingular elliptic curve thus required 13 eld multiplications and a doubling
required 7 multiplications. Assuming a Hamming weight multiplier of weight 20
(notice that this does not compromise the security of the system) and a clock rate
of 40 MHz, the approximate throughput rate on any non-supersingular elliptic curve
over GF (2155) is 60 kbits per second (notice that for the unrestricted multiplier the
throughput was estimated to be 40 kbits per second).
4.1.3 Software Implementation over GF (2155) Using Standard
Basis Representation
The contribution by [SOOS95] describes an implementation of the Die-Hellman
(DH) key exchange protocol using a non-supersingular elliptic curve over the eld
GF (2155). In this implementation, the constant a in (2.3) is chosen to be equal to
zero. With this choice, one eectively eliminates one addition from the calculation of
the x-coordinate of a point P for both addition and doubling of elliptic curve points.
The computation of eP , where e is a large integer and P is a point on the
elliptic curve, is crucial to the speed of the key exchange or digital signature gener-
ation. In particular, the number of point additions and point doublings should be
minimized. For a randomly chosen 155-bit multiplier, the computation of eP will
require on average 154 point doublings and 77 point additions using the standard
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double and add algorithm. Although, the number of doublings is essentially xed, it
is possible to reduce the number of additions. [SOOS95] implemented speed{ups to
this end.
In the initial phase of the DH protocol both parties choose a primitive element
P0. Then, they generate their secret keys aA; aB 2 Z and compute their public
keys KpubA = aAP0 and KpubB = aBP0, both points on the elliptic curve. Since
P0 is a system parameter, the preparation of tables of multiples of P0 are useful.
[SOOS95] used a precomputed table which consisted of (16)q P0 for q = 0;    ; 38, to
compute eP , where e is a 155-bit integer, with 42 point additions and no doublings.
In Section 4.3, we discuss this method further which was introduced by [BGMW92].
In the second phase of the DH protocol, one is required to compute a multiple
of point P (the public key of the other party) not known ahead of time. For this
situation [SOOS95] implemented a blend of the k-ary method [Knu81] and Booth’s
algorithm. In this case, a table of the odd multiples of P is computed from P
to 15P . Then, using the table, several doubling steps can be performed before an
addition is necessary. In the case that an even multiple of P is necessary, an odd
multiple of P introduced a couple of steps earlier in the doubling process is used
instead. In addition, since subtraction of points is not more costly than addition
one has the option of subtracting a point when necessary. On the average, for a
random 155-bit multiplier, one is required to perform 152 doubling steps and 32
additions/subtractions, including the precomputation.
The operations of addition, squaring, and multiplication in the underlying
Galois Field that are needed to compute the addition or doubling of two elliptic curve
points are implemented using the same principles that were described in Section 3.2,
using the irreducible polynomial P (x) = x155 +x62 + 1 (Notice that [SOOS95] do not
use the Karatsuba-Ofman algorithm or other advanced multiplication algorithms for
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multiplication but rather ordinary polynomial multiplication). However, they develop
a new algorithm for inversion based on the Euclidean division algorithm.
The \Almost Inverse Algorithm" computes B(x) 2 GF (2155) and r such that:
A(x)B(x) = xr mod P (x) (4.1)
where deg(B(x)) < deg(P (x)) and r < 2 deg(P (x)). After executing the algorithm
one only needs to divide B(x) by xr to nd the inverse A(x). The algorithm is
described in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 Let A(x); B(x); xr 2 GF (2k) and let P (x) be the eld polynomial of
GF (2k). Then A−1xr mod P (x) can be computed using the following \Almost Inverse
Algorithm" as follows.
Algorithm (Input: A(x); P (x); Output: A−1xr)
1. Initialization.
1.1 r 0
1.2 B(x) 1
1.3 C(x) 0
1.4 F (x) A(x)
1.5 G(x) P (x)
2. loop: While F (x) is even, do
2.1 F (x) F (x)x−1
2.2 C(x) C(x)x
2.3 k k + 1
3. If F (x) = 1, then return B(x) and k
4. If deg(F (x)) < deg(G(x)), then
4.5.1 F (x) ! G(x) (exchange F (x); G(x))
4.5.2 B(x) ! C(x) (exchange B(x); C(x))
5. F (x) F (x) +G(x)
6. B(x) B(x) + C(x)
7. Goto loop.
In order to obtain the inverse of A(x) one needs to divide B(x) out by xr
working modulo P (x). The strategy proposed in [SOOS95] is to successively divide
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Operations Type of Operation Average Timing
Basic Field Operations 155 bit square 1.65 sec
155 x 155 bit multiply 7.10 sec
155 bit inverse 25.21 sec
Elliptic Curve Operations Multiply new elliptic curve point 7.8 msec
Multiply known elliptic curve point 1.8 msec
Table 4.1: Timings for various eld and elliptic curve operations [SOOS95].
B(x) by uw where w is the word size of the computer and nish up with a division
by a smaller power of x. Two parts can be distinguish in this procedure. First, a
suitably chosen multiple of P (x) (P(x) is multiplied by the least signicant w bits in
B(x)) is added to B(x) so as to zero out the w low order bits of B(x). Second, the
new B(x) is right shifted by w bits, eectively dividing it by xr.
[SOOS95] used a DEC Alpha 3000 with a 175 MHz RISC Architecture and a
64 bit word size. Their timings are summarized in Table 4.1. These timings will be
highly relevant for our work in later chapters.
4.2 Elliptic Curve Implementations over Compos-
ite Fields
Software implementations of EC over composite Galois eld GF ((2n)m) were rst
described in [HMV92] for the eldGF ((28)13). More recently, EC systems for the eld
GF ((216)11) were described independently in [WBV+96] and [Bea96]. The purpose
of this section is to summarize their ndings and contributions. In addition, timings
of the dierent implementations will be provided.
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4.2.1 Implementation over GF ((28)13)
In this paper, [HMV92] compared the basic operations of squaring, multiplication, and
inversion for the elds GF (2105) and GF ((28)13). Arithmetic in GF (2105) was imple-
mented by using normal basis representation. Addition is accomplished by XORing
the two vectors representing the elements to be added. Inversion, on the other hand,
is computed by rst converting to a polynomial basis representation of GF (2105) using
a precomputed change of basis matrix, compute the inverse in polynomial base rep-
resentation using the Euclidean algorithm, and nally, convert back to normal base
representation. Notice, that implementations will more ecient when using optimal
normal basis as opposed to a randomly chosen normal basis.
Arithmetic in the eld GF ((28)13) was implemented using a composite eld
polynomial basis representation or, in other words, by looking at the eld GF (2104) as
a vector space over GF (28) rather than over GF (2). The eld polynomial of GF (28)
was chosen to be the irreducible polynomial Q(y) = y8 + y7 + y3 + y2 + 1. The paper
proposes for the rst time the idea of table look-ups. Two tables \log" and \antilog"
were dened as in (3.2) and (3.3). Then, multiplication and inversion in the ground
eld are accomplished by table look-up (see Section 3.2.1).
The polynomial P (x) = x13+x7+x6+x+1 is chosen to be the eld polynomial
of the composite eld GF ((28)13). Consequently, elements of this eld are represented
as polynomials overGF (28) with maximum degree equal to 12 and all arithmetic done
modulo P (x). Squaring and multiplication in the composite eld are implemented
as described in Sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 with multiplication of coecients being done
through table look-up. Inversion, on the other hand, is implemented by using the
extended Euclidean algorithm. Table 4.2 shows a comparison of the timings of the
basic eld operations on a SUN SPARCstation-2.
Non-supersingular elliptic curves were chosen to implement the cryptosystem.
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Operations Method/Type of Operation GF (2105) GF ((28)13)
Field operations 10000 squarings 0.02 0.15
10000 multiplications 7.6 1.95
10000 inversions 15.3 9.46
Elliptic Curve 10000 curve additions 33.9 14.4
Operations 10000 curve doublings 38.6 16.2
eP using double and add |- 0.24
eP using Brickell’s method |- 0.052
Table 4.2: Comparison of timings for elliptic curve and eld operations using normal
and polynomial basis representations (time in seconds)[HMV92].
They conclude that although hardware implementations can take advantage of pro-
jective coordinates (thus avoiding inversions), it seems that in software the ane
representation is superior. Finally, they suggest an alternate method to the double
and add algorithm for computing the multiple of a point. This method is developed
in [BGMW92] and it will be treated in Section 4.3. Table 4.2 shows the timings
for the basic curve operations (doubling and addition of points) as well as for the
computation of the multiple of a point.
4.2.2 Implementations over GF ((216)11)
In both [WBV+96] and [Bea96] elliptic curve cryptosystems were implemented using
non-supersingular elliptic curves. Both implementations explore arithmetic over the
composite elds GF ((216)11) using polynomial basis representations over GF (216).
In both contributions, addition, squaring, and multiplication are implemented in the
same form, as explained in Sections 3.2.2, 3.2.4, and 3.2.3. Notice that multiplication
of the coecients of two elements of the eld GF ((216)11) is accomplished through
table look-up as proposed in [HMV92]. Inversion, however, is very dierent in both
implementations.
[WBV+96] explores two approaches. The rst approach consists of computing
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the inverse of an element A(x) 2 GF ((2n)m) using the extended Euclidean algorithm
which is described in Theorem 3. In this theorem the following notation is used:
Given a polynomial A(x) of degree m− 1, A0 represents the number of coecients in
A(x) (or m) and Ai represents the i− 1 coecient if A(x) is represented as in (3.1).
[WBV+96] concludes that this algorithm is faster in a polynomial base for composite
elds than in elds GF (2k).
The second approach is the Almost Inverse algorithm explained in Theorem 2.
[WBV+96] compares the two algorithms and observes that their behavior is very
similar. The main dierence is that the Almost Inverse algorithm cancels powers of x
from lower degree to higher degree whereas the extended Euclidean algorithm moves
from higher degree to lower degree. This translates into two important benets of the
Almost Inverse algorithm when working in standard base representation. However,
if working in polynomial base representation this advantages are irrelevant and thus,
[WBV+96] conclude that the Euclidean division algorithm is slightly more ecient
since it returns the inverse at the end of its execution as opposed to the Almost
Inverse algorithm where one still has to divide by xr.
Theorem 3 Let A(x); B(x);2 GF ((2n)m) and let P (x) be the eld polynomial of
GF ((2n)m). Then B(x) = A−1 mod P (x) can be computed using the extended Eu-
clidean algorithm as follows.
Algorithm (Input: A(x); P (x); Output: A−1)
1. Initialization.
1.1 B(x) 1
1.2 C(x) 0
1.3 F (x) A(x)
1.4 G(x) P (x)
2. Do
2.1 If deg(F (x)) = 0 then return B(x)=F1
2.2 If deg(F (x)) < deg(G(x)) then
2.2.1 F (x) ! G(x) (exchange F (x); G(x))
2.2.2 B(x) ! C(x) (exchange B(x); C(x))
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2.3 j = deg(F (x))− deg(G(x))
2.4  = FF0=GG0
2.5 F (x) F (x) + xjG(x)
2.6 B(x) B(x) + xjC(x)
Goto 2
Finally, the computation of the multiple of a point is achieved by implementing
the double and add/subtract algorithm. [WBV+96] use a 177-bit multiplier which
means that 176 doublings and an average of 59 additions/subtractions are required
for one \exponentiation."
[Bea96] explores an implementation of the inversion operation originally de-
scribed in [IT88]. In this paper, an ecient method for inversion in GF (2k) based
on Fermat’s little theorem is discussed. In Section 6 of the reference the method is
extended to composite Galois elds GF ((2n)m) using normal base representation. On
the other hand, this inversion algorithm was optimized for composite elds in poly-
nomial base representation in [Paa94] and [Paa95] and it will be treated extensively
in Chapter 6 of this thesis. In addition, the analog of an exponentiation operation
for elliptic curves was implemented using the double and add algorithm described in
Theorem 1. Thus, a 176-bit multiplier e meant that eP would take 175 doublings and
an average of 86 addition steps. Finally, [Bea96] implemented the elliptic curve ana-
log of the Die-Hellman Key exchange. Table 4.3 compares the timing results that
both [WBV+96] and [Bea96] presented in their contributions. Notice that [WBV+96]
measurements were performed in a Pentium/133 based PC whereas [Bea96] used a
DEC Alpha 3000, 175 MHz RISC architecture with a 64-bit word size.
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Operations Method/Type of Operation [WBV+96] [Bea96]
Field operations 176 bit add 1.2 1.19
176 bit squaring 5.9 4.23
176 bit multiply 62.7 43
176 bit inversion 160 285
Elliptic Curve Addition 306 (estimate) 452
Operations Doubling 309 (estimate) 441
Point multiplication 72 ms (estimate) 123 ms
Elliptic curve key exchange |- 246 ms
Table 4.3: Comparison of timings for elliptic curve and eld operations between
elliptic curve implementations over GF ((216)11). NOTE: unmarked times are in mi-
croseconds.
4.3 Ecient Exponentiation
The problem of multiplying a point P of an EC by a (large) integer k is analogous
to exponentiation of an element in a multiplicative group to the kth power. The
standard algorithm for this problem is the binary exponentiation method (or square-
and-multiply algorithm) which is studied in detail in [Knu81] and versions of which
have been adapted to the elliptic curve case in Theorem 1. A generalization of the
binary method is the k-ary method [Coh93, Koc95, MvOV97] which processes k ex-
ponent bits in one iteration. Theorem 4 was adapted from [MvOV97] and it describes
the algorithm as it is applied to elliptic curves.
Theorem 4 Let P 2 E and e = (etet−1    e1e0)b be the radix representation of the
multiplier e in base b where b = 2k for k  1. Then, Q = eP can be computed using
the following algorithm.
Algorithm (Input: P = (x; y); e; Output: Q = eP )
1. Precomputation
1.1 P0  O (Point at innity)
1.2 For i = 1 to 2k − 1
Pi = Pi−1 + P (i.e., Pi = i  P )
2. Q O
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3. For i = t to 0
3.1 Q 2kQ
3.2 Q Q+ Pei
4. Return(Q)
Notice that Step 3.1 in the algorithm involves the doubling of point Q, k times,
and Step 3.2 requires one point addition. Thus, the complexity of the k-ary method
with t iterations is kt point doublings, t point additions from the loop in Step 3, and
2k − 2 point additions from the precomputation in Step 1.2 (One should not count
the rst addition in Step 1.2 since P is added to the point at innity).
Theorem 5 Let P 2 E and e = (etet−1    e1e0)b be the radix representation of the
multiplier e in base b where b = 2k for k  1. Also, for each i such that 0  i  t, if
ei 6= 0, then write ei = 2hiui where ui is odd; if ei = 0 then let hi = 0; ui = 0. Then,
Q = eP can be computed using the following algorithm.
Algorithm (Input: P = (x; y); e; Output: Q = eP )
1. Precomputation
1.1 P0  O (Point at innity)
1.2 P1  P
1.3 P2  2P
1.4 For i = 1 to 2k−1 − 1
P2i+1 = P2i−1 + P2
2. Q O
3. For i = t to 0
Q 2hi(2k−hiQ+ Pui)
4. Return(Q)
Further improvements of the k-ary method include the improved k-ary method
and the sliding window method both treated in [MvOV97] and [Koc95]. Theorems 5
and 6 have been adapted from [MvOV97] and describe these algorithms.
Theorem 6 Let P 2 E and e = (etet−1    e1e0)2 be the binary representation of the
multiplier e together with an integer k  1 (window size). Then, Q = eP can be
computed using the following algorithm.
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Algorithm (Input: P = (x; y); e; Output: Q = eP )
1. Precomputation
1.1 P1  P
1.2 P2  2P
1.3 For i = 1 to 2k−1 − 1
P2i+1 = P2i−1 + P2
2. Q O
3. i t
4. While i  0 do
4.1 If ei = 0 then
4.1.1 Q 2Q
4.1.2 i i− 1
4.2 Else, nd the longest bit-string eiei−1    el
such that i− l + 1  k and el = 1, and do the following
4.2.1 A 2i−l+1A+ P(eiei−1el)2
4.2.2 i l − 1
5. Return(Q)
[Koc95] performs a detailed analysis of all window techniques for exponentia-
tion. In addition, Chapter 7 will explore the application of several of this techniques
to elliptic curve cryptosystems over composite elds GF ((216)11) and it will provide
a complexity analysis of this algorithms for special cases.
Finally, in some protocols, like in the calculation of the public key in the
Die-Hellman key exchange, the point P , input to these exponentiation algorithms,
is known ahead of time. In these cases, it is possible to apply an algorithm introduced
in [BGMW92]. This algorithm is described in Theorem 7 which has been adapted
from the original paper to the case of elliptic curves.
Theorem 7 Let P 2 E and let h and e = Pti=0 eisi be positive integers with 0 
ei  h and 0  i  t. Now, suppose the products Pi = siP for 0  i  t are available
ahead of time by precomputation (Storage required is for t + 1 curve points). Then,
if t + h  2, Q = eP can be computed with t + h − 2 additions with the following
algorithm shows.
Algorithm (Input: fs0P; s1P;    ; stPg, e = Pti=0 eisi,and h; Output: Q = eP )
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1. B  O (Point at innity)
2. Q O (Point at innity)
3. For j = h to 1 by -1
3.1 For each i for which ei = j do the following
B  B + siP
3.2 Q B +Q
4. Return(Q)
The most obvious application of Theorem 7 is the case in which the multiplier
e is represented in radix b. Then, if e =
Pt
i=0 eib
i, Pi = biP for 0  i  t are
precomputed. In addition, if we assume that e will be uniformly distributed on the
range f0;    ; Ng, then t+1  dlogbNe, we will expect on average that a digit (in the
b-radix representation of e) will be zero about 1=b of the time and thus, the average
number of additions will be b−1
b
dlogbNe+ b− 3 (Notice h = b− 1).
Chapter 5
Fast Multiplication in Composite
Galois Fields GF ((2n)m)
With respect to complexity, eld multiplication is the second most costly operation in
EC systems only after inversion. Since the new point multiplication algorithm from
Section 7.1 trades eld inversions for eld multiplications, it is especially attractive to
provide ecient multiplication algorithms. In this section we apply the Karatsuba-
Ofman Algorithm (KOA) [Knu81, KO63] to polynomials over Galois elds GF (2n)
of degree m − 1 which represent a eld element in GF ((2n)m). First, we consider
the general KOA as it is applied to two polynomials A(x) and B(x) with maximum
degree m−1 over the eld F . We present the results for the case m = 2t as described
in [Paa96]. In addition, we derive new formulas for the multiplicative and additive
complexity for the cases m = 2tl and m = 2tl − 1. Finally, we dene two new
operations, table look-up (TLU) and exponent addition (EXPA), and derive their
complexities for the three cases. These two operations are of central importance for
an exact complexity analysis of a software implementation of the KOA in composite
elds.
38
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5.1 The KOA for Polynomials of Degree 2t − 1
Recall from Section 3.2.3 that eld multiplication inGF ((2n)m) consists of polynomial
multiplication and modulo reduction, where polynomial multiplication is by far the
most costly operation. We are interested in nding the product of two polynomials
A(x) and B(x) with maximum degree of 2t − 1 over a eld F . Note that straight-
forward polynomial multiplication requires m2 coecient multiplications. Thus, each
polynomial possesses at most 2t = m, t integer, coecients and we want to nd
C(x) = A(x)B(x) such that deg(C(x))  2m − 2. Then by splitting A(x) and B(x)
into an upper and lower half, we can apply the KOA as follows:
A(x) = x
m
2 (am−1x
m
2
−1 +    + am
2
) + (am
2
−1x
m
2
−1 +   + a0) = Ahxm2 +Al
B(x) = x
m
2 (bm−1x
m
2
−1 +   + bm
2
) + (bm
2
−1x
m
2
−1 +    + b0) = Bhxm2 +Bl (5.1)
Using (5.1), a set of auxiliary polynomials D(i)j (x) (for i = 1 : : : t and j = 0 : : : (3
i−1))
can be dened as follows:
D(1)0 (x) = Al(x)Bl(x)
D(1)1 (x) = (Ah(x) +Al(x))(Bh(x) +Bl(x)) (5.2)
D
(1)
2 (x) = Ah(x)Bh(x)
Then, C(x) = A(x)B(x) is obtained by:
C(x) = D
(1)
0 (x) + (D
(1)
1 (x)−D(1)0 (x)−D(1)2 (x))x
m
2 +D
(1)
2 (x)x
m (5.3)
Since (5.2) requires three multiplications of polynomials with m=2 coecients, the
number of multiplications has been reduced to 3=4m2. However, the algorithm can be
applied recursively to the three polynomial multiplications in (5.2). The polynomials
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Ah, Al, and (Ah +Al) as well as their B counterparts are again split in half yielding
polynomials D
(2)
j (x) of degree m=2
2− 1. In the ith iteration deg(D(i)j (x)) = m=2i− 1
and after t = log2m steps the algorithm ends with polynomials D
(t)
j (x) of degree 0.
The following theorem derived in [Paa96] provides expressions for the computational
complexity of the KOA for polynomials over elds of characteristic 2. Notice that
MUL denotes the number of coecient multiplications and ADD denotes the number
of coecient additions in GF (2n).
Theorem 8 Consider two arbitrary polynomials in one variable of degree less than or
equal to m− 1 where m = 2t, with coecients in a eld F of characteristic 2. Then,
by using the Karatsuba-Ofman algorithm the polynomials can be multiplied with:
#MUL = mlog2 3 (5.4)
#ADD  6mlog2 3 − 8m+ 2 (5.5)
It should be noted that since we assume a eld F with characteristic 2, the subtrac-
tions in (5.3) become additions.
5.2 Complexity of the KOA for Polynomials of De-
gree 2tl − 1
In this section we generalize the KOA from above. In the following, gcd(l; 2) = 1.
We consider the product of two polynomials A(x) and B(x) with maximum degree
of 2tl − 1 over a eld F . In particular, we want to nd C(x) = A(x)B(x) such that
deg(C(x))  2m− 2 with m = 2tl, t an integer. Notice that since the polynomial has
an even number of coecients m, the general KOA can still be applied and (5.1) and
(5.2) still hold. However, since the algorithm can only run for t iterations (as many
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powers of 2 as there are in m), we get in the nal step that deg(D(t)j (x)) = l − 1.
Polynomials D(t)j are then multiplied using the school book method.
Theorem 9 Consider two arbitrary polynomials in one variable of degree less than or
equal to m− 1 where m = 2tl, with coecients in a eld F of characteristic 2. Then,
by using the Karatsuba-Ofman algorithm the polynomials can be multiplied with:
#MUL = l2

m
l
log2 3
= l2−log2 3mlog2 3 (5.6)
#ADD = (l − 1)2

m
l
log2 3
+ (8l − 2)

m
l
log2 3 − 8m+ 2 (5.7)
Proof. We will consider three dierent stages in the algorithm. First, we
consider the number of additions due to the splitting in (5.2). Taking into
account that the number of polynomials triples after each iteration step, and
noticing that the KAO runs t times, we nd:
#ADD1 =
tX
i=1
3i−1
2m
2i
=
2m
3
 
2

3
2
t+1
− 3
!
= 2l

m
l
log2 3 − 2m
Second, we consider the product of the D
(t)
j (x) polynomials (all of which are of
degree l − 1). Since we can not split them anymore, the school book method
is applied to each of the D
(t)
j (x) polynomials yielding l
2 multiplications and
(l− 1)2 additions per product. Noticing again that the number of polynomials
triples with each iteration step and that KAO has run through t iterations, it
is easy to see that multiplying 3t = (m=l)log2 3 polynomials requires:
#MUL1 = l
2

m
l
log2 3
#ADD2 = (l− 1)2

m
l
log2 3
The third and nal stage corresponds to merging the polynomials according to
(5.3). It is important to point out that there are two kinds of additions (or
subtractions) involved. First, the additions due to subtracting three polynomi-
als with 2il − 1 coecients and second, the additions due to the overlapping
of terms. In the rst case, one should take into account that there are 2 sub-
tractions per coecient and that the number of polynomials triples with each
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iteration, one readily obtains:
#ADD3a =
tX
i=1
3t−i2(2il − 1)
In the second case, we notice that deg(D
(t−i+1)
j (x)) = 2
il−2 (again for i = 1 : : : t
and j = 0 : : : (3i − 1)). Since the degree of the polynomials corresponding to a
given iteration is always the same, we can pick any j. Thus, we consider the
case for j=0. Then:
D
(t−i)
0 = D
(t−i+1)
0 (x)+(D
(t−i+1)
1 (x)−D(t−i+1)0 (x)−D(t−i+1)2 (x))x2
i−1l+D
(t−i+1)
2 (x)x
2il
From this equation is easy to get the overlap by:
#ADDoverlap3terms = (2
il− 2− 2i−1l+ 1) + (2i−1l+ 2il− 2− 2il+ 1) = 2il− 2
Since the number of polynomials triples with each iteration, we nd:
#ADD3b =
tX
i=1
3t−i(2il − 2)
Combining the additions of this last step one gets that the total number of
additions due to the merging of the polynomials according to (5.3) is
#ADD3 =
tX
i=1
3t−i(2(2il − 1) + (2il− 2)) = (6l− 2)

m
l
log2 3 − 6m+ 2
Then, the overall complexities in Theorem 2 are obtained by summation of the
partial complexities. This ends the proof. 2
Notice that (5.6) and (5.7) reduce to (5.4) and (5.5) for l = 1.
5.3 Complexity of the KOA for Polynomials of De-
gree 2tl − 2
In the previous sections, we covered the cases for m = 2t and m = 2tl. However,
in applications of elliptic curve systems we are often interested in composite elds
over the Galois eld GF ((2n)m) where n and m are relatively prime as described in
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Section 4.2. Since it is often desired to have n even there is a need to consider the
case for odd m, i.e., m = 2tl − 1. In particular, we want to nd C(x) = A(x)B(x)
such that deg(C(x))  2m−2 with m = 2tl−1, t an integer. Then, we can represent
A(x) and B(x) in a way similar to (5.1) by adding an extra term with coecient
am = 0. For convenience, we will introduce the parameter k = m + 1 and express
A(x) and B(x) as follows:
A(x) = x
k
2 (0x
k
2
−1 + ak−2x
k
2
−2 +   + a k
2
) + (a k
2
−1x
k
2
−1 +   + a0) = Ahx k2 +Al
B(x) = x
k
2 (0x
k
2
−1 + bk−2x
k
2
−2 +   + b k
2
) + (b k
2
−1x
k
2
−1 +   + b0) = Bhx k2 +Bl
(5.8)
Notice that now the polynomials A(x) and B(x) have an even number of
coecients (k = m+ 1 = 2tl), allowing us to apply the general KOA to (5.8) t times.
This reduces this problem to the case for m = 2tl, permitting us to apply the same
equations. However, since we have one less coecient the nal multiplicative and
additive complexities are reduced. Theorem 3 summarizes the results.
Theorem 10 Consider two arbitrary polynomials in one variable of degree less than
or equal to m − 1 where m = 2tl − 1, with coecients in a eld F of characteristic
2. Then, by using the Karatsuba-Ofman algorithm the polynomials can be multiplied
with:
#MUL = l2

m+ 1
l
log2 3
− 2l + 1 (5.9)
#ADD = (l − 1)2

m+ 1
l
log2 3
+(8l − 2)

m+ 1
l
log2 3
− 8(m+ 1) + (5− 2l − 4t) (5.10)
Proof. In order to prove Theorem 3, we will again consider three dierent
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stages of the KOA. In the rst stage, we consider the number of additions due
to the splitting in (5.2). In this case, the number of polynomials triples after
each iteration, thus the total number of polynomials is the same as in the case
m = 2tl. However, in each iteration the total number of additions is decreased
by two since the total number of \real coecients" in A(x) or B(x) is at most
2tl − 1 as opposed to 2tl. Therefore, we nd:
#ADD1 =
tX
i=1

3i−1
2k
2i

− 2 = 2l

m+ 1
l
log2 3
− 2(m+ 1)− 2t
Second, we consider the product of the D
(t)
j (x) polynomials (notice that as
in the previous cases, we will refer to the polynomials in each iteration as
D
(i)
j (x) with j = 0 : : :3
i − 1) all of which have l coecients except for the one
corresponding to j = 3t−1 which only has l−1 coecients. As before, we apply
the school book method to nd the product yielding (l − 1)2 multiplications
and (l−2)2 additions for D(t)3t−1(x) and l2 multiplications and (l−1)2 additions
for the rest. Thus:
#MUL1 = 2 l
2 3t−1 + (3t−1− 1)l2 + (l− 1)2 = 3tl2 − 2l+ 1
#ADD2 = 2 (l− 1)2 3t−1 + (3t−1− 1)(l− 1)2 + (l − 2)2 = 3t(l − 1)2 − 2l+ 3
Third, we consider the merging of the polynomials according to (5.3). It is
important to point out that, as before, there are two kinds of additions (or
subtractions) involved (notice that since we restrict our discussion to elds of
characteristic 2 subtractions and additions are equivalent). First, subtracting
three polynomials with either k=2i−1 − 1 or k=2i−1 − 3 coecients and second,
the additions due to the overlapping of terms. In the rst case, one should take
into account that there are two subtractions per coecient, that the number of
polynomials triples with each iteration, and that in each iteration there is only
one polynomial that has two coecients less than the rest. Combining these
observations, one obtains:
#ADD3a =
tX
i=1
2 3t−i(2il− 1)− 2
Second, 2il − 2 additions due to the overlapping of the three terms. It turns
out that the number of overlaps is the same as in the case m = 2tl. However,
one should be careful of the values of l for which this assertion holds. As we
know, the only polynomial that is shorter than those for the case m = 2tl are
the polynomials D
(i)
3i−1(x), so these are the ones we should consider to see if
there are any changes with respect to the previous cases. So we have that in
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general:
D
(t−i)
3t−i−1 = D
(t−i+1)
3t−i+1−3+

D
(t−i+1)
3t−i+1−2 −D
(t−i+1)
3t−i+1−3 −D
(t−i+1)
3t−i+1−1

x
k
2t−i+1 +D
(t−i+1)
3t−i+1−1x
k
2t−i
Noticing that
deg(D
(t−i+1)
3t−i+1−3) = deg(D
(t−i+1)
3t−i+1−2) =
k
2t−i
− 2
deg(D
(t−i+1)
3t−i+1−1) =
k
2t−i
− 4
We readily get that the following condition should hold:
k
2t−i
− 2 + k
2t−i+1
 k
2t−i
− 4 + k
2t−i
Using the fact that k = 2tl and rearranging terms, we nd:
2i−1(2l− 1)  2
Since i goes from 1 to t, it is sucient to nd the values of l for which the
following inequality is true:
(2l− 1)  2
Solving for l, we nd that l  1:5. But l has to be an odd number greater than
1 (from the denition of m),thus, the number of additions due to overlapping
is
#ADD3b =
tX
i=1
2 3t−i(2il− 2)
for any value of l which is consistent with our denition of m. Combining the
partial results we obtain (5.9) and (5.10). This completes our proof. 2
5.4 Complexity Analysis for Software Implemen-
tations
It was explained in Section 3.2.1 that one of the advantages of using composite elds
was that both multiplication and inversion inGF ((2n)m) could be reduced to inversion
and multiplication in the ground eld which are realized through table look-ups.
In this section we will apply this concept to obtain exact counts of the number of
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operations needed to perform a multiplication in the eld GF ((2n)m). Notice that
here we use the fact that all non-zero elements ai 2 GF (2n) form a cyclic group. As
stated in Section 3.2.1, these elements can be expressed as multiples of a primitive
element !: ai = !i.
Then, we store all the pairs (ai; i) in two tables: log and antilog, sorted by the
rst component (ai) and second component (i), respectively. Thus, the product of two
elements aj; ak 2 GF (2n) can be obtained as shown in (3.4). Notice that (3.4) implies
that two elements of the ground eld GF (2n) can be multiplied using three table
look-up operations and one addition modulo the order of the multiplicative group
(exponent addition). It is important to point out that depending on the hardware
platform (e.g., microprocessor, RISC, etc.) the relative speed for the two types of
operations can dier dramatically. For instance, in our implementation where n = 16
it was found that access to the large look-up tables took about 6 clock cycles on a
DEC Alpha workstation, whereas element addition and exponent addition took about
2 clock cycles on average. Thus, in order to obtain valid performance predictions one
needs exact counts of the number of operations.
Based on these two new operations (table look up (TLU) and exponent addi-
tion (EXPA)) we have derived new formulas and re-written Theorems 1, 2, and 3 as
follows.
Corollary 1 Consider two arbitrary polynomials A(x); B(x) in one variable of degree
less than or equal to m−1 where m = 2t, with coecients in a eld F of characteristic
2. Then, by using the Karatsuba-Ofman algorithm the polynomials can be multiplied
with:
#ADD = 6mlog2 3 − 8m+ 2 (5.11)
#TLU = 3mlog2 3 (5.12)
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#EXPA = mlog2 3 (5.13)
Proof. The number of additions follows directly from Theorem 1. The number
of exponent additions is the same as the number of multiplications since for each
multiplication one has to perform one exponent addition, so this also follows
from Theorem 1. The TLU’s can be divided into three kinds. First, the TLU’s
needed to convert each element i to its corresponding exponent representation
i. These are just twice the number of coecients in one of the polynomials being
multiplied or 2m = 2t+1. Second, we consider the number of TLU’s required to
convert back to vector representation once two elements have been multiplied.
These are just equal to the number of multiplications or mlog2 3. Finally, we
consider the number of TLU’s due to splitting of polynomials in (5.2). From
[Paa96] proof of the complexity of the KOA for the polynomials of degree 2t−1,
we nd that the number of additions due to the splitting is:
#ADDsplitting = 2m
log2 3 − 2m = 2(3t −m)
But each time you perform an addition due to the splitting, you create a new
coecient that needs to be transform to exponent representation, one concludes
that the number of additions due to the splitting and the number of TLU’s due
to the splitting are the same. Thus, adding up the partial results one obtains
(5.12). This ends the proof. 2
Corollary 2 Consider two arbitrary polynomials in one variable of degree less than
or equal to m − 1 where m = 2tl, with coecients in a eld F of characteristic
2. Then, by using the Karatsuba-Ofman algorithm the polynomials can be multiplied
with:
#ADD = (l− 1)2

m
l
log2 3
+ (8l − 2)

m
l
log2 3 − 8m+ 2 (5.14)
#TLU = l

m
l
log2 3
(l + 2) (5.15)
#EXPA = l2

m
l
log2 3
(5.16)
Proof. As in Corollary 1, both the number of additions and exponent addi-
tions follow from Theorem 2. The number of TLU’s can be found by adding
the TLU’s needed to convert each element i to its corresponding exponent
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representation i or 2m = 2t+1l, the number of TLU’s required to convert back
to vector representation once two elements have been multiplied which is the
same as the number of multiplications, and the number of TLU’s due to the
splitting of polynomials in (5.2) which as in the case of Corollary 1 is equal to
the number of additions due to the splitting or 2l
(m
l
log2 3 − 2m. Adding up
the partial results we get (5.15). 2
Corollary 3 Consider two arbitrary polynomials in one variable of degree less than
or equal to m − 1 where m = 2tl − 1, with coecients in a eld F of characteristic
2. Then, by using the Karatsuba-Ofman algorithm the polynomials can be multiplied
with:
#ADD = (l− 1)2

m+ 1
l
log2 3
+(8l − 2)

m+ 1
l
log2 3
− 8(m+ 1) + (5− 2l − 4t) (5.17)
#TLU =

m+ 1
l
log2 3
l(l + 2)− 2(t+ l) (5.18)
#EXPA = l2

m+ 1
l
log2 3
− 2l + 1 (5.19)
Proof. (5.17) and (5.19) follow directly from Theorem 3. The number of TLU’s
is obtained from the number of TLU’s needed to convert each element i to
its corresponding exponent representation i or 2m = 2t+1l− 2, the the number
of TLU’s required to convert back to vector representation once two elements
have been multiplied which is the same as the number of multiplications, and
the number of TLU’s due to the splitting of polynomials in (5.2) which is equal
to the number of additions due to the splitting or 2l

m+1
l
log2 3−2(m+1)−2t.
Adding up the partial results one nds (5.18). 2
5.5 Multiplication in GF ((216)11)
We summarize this section by considering the complexity of a multiplication in
GF ((2n)m) for n = 16 and m = 11. We can apply Corollary 3 and let m = 11,
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l = 3, and t = 2. From there we obtain that one needs 129 additions and 76 multipli-
cations in GF (216) or equivalently, 129 coecient additions, 125 table look-ups, and
76 exponent additions. Notice, when using the regular method for multiplication one
would require 121 multiplications and 100 coecient additions or, in terms of table
look-ups, 100 coecient additions, 121 + 22 = 143 table look-ups, and 121 exponent
additions. If one compares both complexities and ignores exponent and coecient
additions, one can readily see that the theoretical improvement in the timing for the
multiplication operation when using the Karatsuba-Ofman algorithm would be about
12.5 percent.
Method Average Timing (sec)
Straight forward method 43.0
Karatsuba-Ofman algorithm 38.6
Table 5.1: Comparison of timings for 176-bit multiplication in GF ((216)11) using the
Karatsuba-Ofman algorithm and the straight forward multiplication method.
Table 5.1 compares the timings obtained from the implementation of both
multiplication algorithms (KOA and regular multiplication). It can be seen from the
table that the improvement in timing for one multiplication is about 10.5 percent
which agrees with the theoretical predictions.
Chapter 6
Ecient Inversion in Composite
Galois Fields GF ((2n)m)
As stated in the previous sections, inversion is the most costly arithmetic operation
in EC systems. In the following an inversion method based on Fermat’s little theorem
will be developed which is entirely dierent from the approach in [WBV+96, SOOS95].
The basic property of the algorithm developed in this section is that inversion in
GF ((2n)m) is reduced to inversion in the subeld GF (2n). It is important to point
out that subeld inversion can be done extremely fast through table look-up provided
n is moderate, say n  16. Notice also that the Itoh and Tsujii’s Algorithm intro-
duced in [IT88] was originally applied to composite elds GF ((2n)m) represented in
normal bases. However, we applied and optimized this algorithm to composite elds
in standard base representation, as suggested in [Paa95]. Finally, we show a major
computational advantage for the case that the eld polynomial has only coecients
from GF (2).
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We want to determine the inverse of A 2 GF ((2n)m), A 6= 0. A is given as
A(x) = am−1xm−1 +   + a1x+ a0; ai 2 GF (2n): (6.1)
By applying Fermat’s Theorem, we can readily obtain that
A2
nm−1 = AA2
nm−2 = 1; 8A 2 GF ((2n)m) n f0g; (6.2)
from which it follows that
A−1 = A2
nm−2: (6.3)
(6.3) shows that the inverse of an elementA 2 GF ((2n)m) can be computed by raising
it to the power of 2nm − 2 = 2 + 22 + 23 +    + 2nm−1 using the standard \binary
method" described in [Knu81]. However, in the following we derive a method which
reduces inversion in the composite eld GF ((2n)m) can be reduced to inversion in
the ground eld GF (2n), one obtains a better method to calculate the inverse of an
element A. The following theorem describes the algorithm.
Theorem 11 [Paa94] The multiplicative inverse of an element A of the composite
eld GF ((2n)m) can be computed by
A−1 = (Ar)−1Ar−1; (6.4)
where Ar 2 GF (2n) and r = (2nm − 1)=(2n − 1).
Computing the inverse through Theorem (11) requires four steps: exponentia-
tion in GF ((2n)m) (Ar−1), multiplication of A and Ar−1 to get Ar 2 GF (2n), inversion
in GF (2n), and multiplication of (Ar)−1Ar−1. Each of these steps will be analyzed in
the following.
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6.1 Exponentiation in GF ((2n)m)
The rst step in the algorithm above is the computation of Ar−1 where A 2GF ((2n)m).
Notice that r can be expressed as a sum of powers as follows:
r − 1 = 2
nm − 1
2n − 1 − 1 = 2
n + 22n + 23n +    + 2(m−1)n (6.5)
This representation is similar to the binary representation of the number
2nm − 2 = 2 + 22 + 23 +    + 2nm−1 and hence, the optimized method from [IT88]
can be applied. The method requires blog2(m− 1)c+ Hw(m − 1)− 1 general multi-
plications and m − 1 exponentiations to the power of 2n [IT88], with both types of
operations performed in GF ((2n)m)(Hw() denotes the Hamming weight of the binary
representation of the operand). Multiplications can be realized using the Karatsuba-
Ofman Algorithm described in Chapter 5 and exponentiation is realized as explained
below. Let B and C be elements of GF ((2n)m). We want to nd C(x) = B2
n
, where
B(x) =
Pm−1
i=0 bix
i. This can be performed as follows (the proof is based on [McE87,
Lemma 5.12]):
C(x) =
m−1X
i=0
cix
i =
 
m−1X
i=0
bix
i
!2n
=
m−1X
i=0
b2
n
i x
i2n =
m−1X
i=0
bix
i2n; bi 2 GF (2n): (6.6)
Assuming 2n > m − 1, there are m − 1 powers of x which must be reduced
modulo the eld polynomial P (x), namely the powers xi2
n
, i = 1; 2; : : : ;m − 1. We
use the following notation for the representation of these powers in the residue classes
modulo P (x):
xi2
n
= s0;i + s1;ix+   + sm−1;ixm−1 mod P (x); i = 1; 2; : : : ;m− 1: (6.7)
Using the coecients sj;i, the exponentiations in (6.6) can be expressed in matrix
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form as
0BBBBBBBB@
c0
c1
...
cm−1
1CCCCCCCCA
=
0BBBBBBBB@
1 s0;1 s0;2    s0;m−1
0 s1;1 s1;2    s1;m−1
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 sm−1;1 sm−1;2    sm−1;m−1
1CCCCCCCCA
0BBBBBBBB@
b0
b1
...
bm−1
1CCCCCCCCA
: (6.8)
A main computational advantage occurs if P (x) is chosen to have only binary
coecients, as suggested in Section 3.2.3. In this case, all powers of xa mod P (x)
belong to a subeld whose elements are represented by binary polynomials. In par-
ticular, all coecients sn;i in (6.8) are binary, i.e., elements from GF (2). In addition,
since both n and P (x) are known ahead of time one exponentiation is reduced from
(m − 1)m constant multiplications and m(m − 2) + 1 additions to only (m − 1)2=4
additions on average.
6.2 Multiplication in GF ((2n)m), where the Product
is an Element of GF (2n)
The second step performs the operation
Ar = Ar−1A; (6.9)
where Ar 2 GF (2n), and the two operands are elements in GF ((2n)m). We consider
the multiplication D(x) = B(x)C(x) mod P (x) where B;C 2 GF ((2n)m) and D 2
GF (2n). First, we consider the pure polynomial multiplication of B and C:
D0(x) = B(x)C(x) =
 
m−1X
i=0
bix
i
! 
m−1X
i=0
cix
i
!
=
 
m−2X
i=0
d0ix
i
!
: (6.10)
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We know that D0(x)  D(x) = d0 mod P (x), i.e., that all but the zero coef-
cient of D0(x) vanish after reduction modulo P (x). The reduction modulo P (x) is
done as explained in Section 3.2.3 with a reduction matrix of the form of (3.8). Using
this matrix representation and the fact that deg(D(x)) = 0, one nds that D(x) can
be expressed as:
D(x) = d0 = d
0
0 +
m−2X
i=0
r0;i d
0
m+i (mod P (x)) (6.11)
which eliminates all constant multiplications.
6.3 Inversion in GF (2n) and Multiplication of an
Element from GF (2n) with an Element from
GF ((2n)m)
The third and fourth steps carry small complexities since both involve operations with
elements of the subeld. First, we calculate the inverse of Ar with two table look-
ups [WBV+96] since Ar is an element of the ground eld. This inversion operation is
accomplished by rst nding the exponent i to which a primitive element ! 2 GF (2n)
would be raised, in order to obtain Ar. This rst step is done by making use of the
log function described in Section 3.2.1 (rst table look-up). Second, one takes the
negative of this exponent modulo 2n − 1, and nally one converts the previous result
back to the element representation with the antilog function (second table look-up).
This process is shown in analytical form in (6.12).
A−r = antilog[− log(Ar) (mod 2n − 1)] (6.12)
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In the fourth step, we compute A−1 = (Ar)−1Ar−1 by multiplying (Ar)−1,
which is also an element of GF (2n), with Ar−1, an element of GF ((2n)m). This last
operation requires m multiplication in the ground eld GF (2n). Notice that there is
no reduction modulo P (x) since all arithmetic is done in GF (2n).
6.4 Inversion in GF ((216)11)
We consider the special case where n = 16 and m = 11. In this case, we chose as
eld polynomial the trinomial P (x) = x11 + x2 + 1 because it would minimize the
number of non-zero entries in the matrices of (6.8) and (3.8). Using this polynomial,
one can nd Ar−1 with 4 multiplications in GF ((216)11 and 390 additions in GF (216).
Similarly, Ar = Ar−1A can be computed using 12 multiplications and 10 additions
in GF (216), (Ar)−1 requires one inversion in the subeld GF (216), and (Ar)−1Ar−1
involves 11 subeld multiplications in GF (216). Thus, the total complexity of an
inversion in GF ((216)11) is 4 multiplications in the composite eld and one inversion,
23 multiplications, and 400 additions in the subeld. This translates into an inversion
time of 158.7 sec. This time is essentially determined by the 4 multiplications
required to perform the inversion operation.
Chapter 7
A New Approach to Point
Doubling for Elliptic Curves
This chapter introduces an entirely new approach for accelerating the multiplication
of points on an elliptic curve. The approach works in conjunction with the k-ary
and the sliding window methods. The method is applicable to elliptic curves over
any eld, but we provide worked-out formulae for elliptic curves over elds of char-
acteristic two. In addition, we show the actual performance of the newly introduced
algorithm and the ones treated in Chapters 5 and 6 in an implementation of an elliptic
curve cryptosystem over GF (2176) = GF ((216)11). We provide absolute timing mea-
surements for an entire elliptic curve multiplication as well as timings for individual
operations.
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7.1 Principle Idea
The basic operation for the DL problem for elliptic curves is \multiplication" of a
point P 2 E with an integer e, which is of the order of #E. One way of performing
this operation is analogous to the square and multiply algorithm for exponentiation
[Knu81] and it is known as \repeated double and add" as described in Theorem 1. A
generalization of this method is the k-ary method which is described in Theorem 4.
This algorithm reduces the number of additions needed in the regular double and add
algorithm.
Notice that in Theorem 4, Step 3.1 in the algorithm involves the doubling of
point Q, k times, and Step 3.2 requires one point addition. Since point doubling is
the most costly operation, it is extremely attractive to nd ways of accelerating the
doubling operation. Recall now from Section 2.2.2 that the doubling of an elliptic
curve point requires one inversion and that in most practical applications, inversion
is by far the most expensive operation to perform. In the following we will introduce
an entirely new approach to compute repeated point doublings over an elliptic curve
which reduces the number of inversion at the cost of extra multiplications and thus
the complexity of the overall computation of the multiple of an elliptic curve point.
Our new approach is based on the following principle. First, observe that the
k-ary method relies on k repeated doublings. The new approach allows computation
of 2kP = (xk; yk) directly from P = (x; y) without computing the intermediate points
2P , 22P ,   ,2k−1P . Such direct formulae are obtained by inserting (2.4) and (2.5)
into one another. Theorem 12 describes a formula for computing two point doublings
directly and its proof gives the derivation.
Theorem 12 Given a point P = (x; y) on the elliptic curve E one can compute
the point Q = 22P = (x2; y2) with 1 inverse, 9 multiplications, 6 squarings, and 10
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additions as shown in (7.1) and (7.2).
x2 =
2 + (γ)
(γ)2
+ a; (7.1)
y2 =
(γ)x2 + (2)2
(γ)2
+ x2; (7.2)
where γ = x2, = γ + y,  = 2 + x+ aγ,  = x+ γ, and  = ( + ) + γ2γ.
Proof. We begin by rewriting (2.4) and (2.5) in terms of x, y, x1, and y1 where
P = (x; y) and 2P = (x1; y1),
x1 =
(x2 + y)2 + (x2 + y)x+ ax2
x2
y1 =
x2x+ (x2 + y)x1
x
+ x1
Letting γ = x2,  = γ + y, and  = 2 + x+ aγ, we get:
x1 =

γ
y1 =
γx+ x1
x
+ x1
Substituting x by x1 and x1 by x2, we readily nd an equation for 2
2P =
(x2; y2),
x2 =
(x21 + y1)
2 + (x21 + y1)x1 + ax
2
1
x21
y2 =
x21x1 + (x
2
1 + y1)x2
x1
+ x2
Next, we consider the term x21 + y1. By using the expressions for x1 and y1 in
terms of γ, , , and the new variables  = x+ γ and  = 2 + γ2γ + , we
get:
x21 + y1 =

γ2
Substituting back into the expression for x2,
x2 =


γ2
2
+


γ2

x1

γ
2 + a
Doing the algebra and simplifying, one readily obtains (7.1). A similar proce-
New Approach to Point Doubling in EC 59
dure will yield for y2 the following intermediate result:
y2 =

γ2
x2 +


γ
2

γ

γ
 + x2
Simplifying and multiplying numerator and denominator by  one gets,
y2 =

γx2+
2
γ2


2
+ x2
which after simplication turns into (7.2). This ends the proof.2
We continued in a similar manner and found expressions for 23P = (x3; y3),
24P = (x4; y4), and 25P = (x5; y5). Again, these expressions, described in Theo-
rems 13, 14, and 15, only require one inversion as opposed to the three, four, or
ve inversions that the regular double and add algorithm would require in each one
of these cases. It is important to point out that the point P has to be an element
of prime order belonging to the cyclic subgroup corresponding to the largest prime
factor in the order of E. This last requirement ensures that 4P , 8P , 16P , or 32P will
never equal O. Notice that this is compliant with [KMQV96].
Theorem 13 Given a point P = (x; y) on the elliptic curve E one can compute the
point Q = 23P = (x3; y3) with 1 inverse, 14 multiplications, 7 squarings, and 17
additions as shown in (7.3) and (7.4).
x3 =
!2 + !
2
+ a (7.3)
y3 =
(2)2 + !x3
2
+ x3 (7.4)
Theorem 14 Given a point P = (x; y) on the elliptic curve E one can compute the
point Q = 24P = (x4; y4) with 1 inverse, 19 multiplications, 15 squarings, and 20
additions as shown in (7.5) and (7.6).
x4 =
2 + 2
(2)2
+ a (7.5)
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y4 =
(2)2 + (2)x4
(2)2
+ x4 (7.6)
Theorem 15 Given a point P = (x; y) on the elliptic curve E one can compute the
point Q = 25P = (x5; y5) with 1 inverse, 24 multiplications, 19 squarings, and 22
additions as shown in (7.7) and (7.8).
x5 =
2 + 2
(2)2
+ a (7.7)
y5 =
(2)2 + x5(2)
(2)2
+ x5 (7.8)
where γ,, , , and  are as dened in Theorem 12, and  = γ,  =
2 +  +  2a,  =  2, ! = ( +  ) + (2)2 + ,  = !2 + ! + a2, and  =
2+(!)+2+(2)2,  = 2,  = 2++a2, and  = (++2)+2(2)2.
The advantage of Equations (7.1) and (7.2) is that they only require one in-
version as opposed to the two inversions that two separate double operations would
require for computing 4P . The \price" that must be paid is 9− 4 = 5 extra multipli-
cations if squarings and additions are ignored. For k = 2, the direct formulae (7.1)
and (7.2) trade thus one inversion at the cost of 5 multiplications. It is easy to see
that the formulae are an advantage in situations where inversion is at least ve times
as costly as multiplication. However, this \break even point" decreases if the method
is extended to the computation of 2kP for k > 2 as described below.
7.1.1 The Break-Even Point
For application in practice it is highly relevant to compare the complexity of our
newly derived formulae with that of the double and add algorithm. If we note that
our method reduces inversions at the cost of multiplications, the performance of the
new method depend on the cost factor of one inversion relatively to the cost of one
multiplication. For this purpose we introduce the notion of a \break even point."
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Since it is possible to express the time that it takes to perform one inversion in terms
of the equivalent number of multiplication times, we dene the break even point as the
number of multiplication times needed per inversion so that our formulae outperform
the regular double and add algorithm. The results are summarized in Table 7.1.
Calculation Method Complexity Break Even Point
Sq. Add. Mult. Inv.
4P Direct Doublings 6 10 9 1 1 inv. > 5 mult.
Individual Doublings 4 10 4 2
8P Direct Doublings 7 17 14 1 1 inv. > 4 mult.
Individual Doublings 6 15 6 3
16P Direct Doublings 15 20 19 1 1 inv. > 3.7 mult.
Individual Doublings 8 20 8 4
32P Direct Doublings 19 22 24 1 1 inv. > 3.5 mult.
Individual Doublings 10 25 10 5
Table 7.1: Complexity comparison: Individual doublings vs. direct computation of
several doublings.
Next, the break-even point is derived for the case of 2 doublings. In general
we have that for our formulae to be advantageous we need the following relation to
hold:
Cost(2 doublings) > Cost(Formula for 2 doublings)
Then, ignoring squarings and additions and expressing the Cost function in terms of
multiplications and inversions, we have:
2(2 multiplications +1 inverse) > (9 multiplications +1 inverse)
Dening r = M=I , where M stands for the time that it takes for one multiplication
to be performed and I is the time for one inversion, one can re-write the above
expressions as:
2(2M + rM) > (9M + rM)
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Solving for r in terms of M one obtains:
r > (9− 4)M ) r > 5M
7.1.2 Theoretical and Practical Timings
We performed timing measurements on the individual doubling operation and the
corresponding formulae presented in Theorems 12, 13, 14,and 15. In addition, we
developed timing estimates based on the observed timings of eld operations in the
Galois eld GF ((216)11) as presented in Table 7.2 (Notice multiplication and inversion
were implemented as described in Chapters 5 and 6).
Type of Operation Average Timing (sec)
176 bit addition 1.19
176 bit squaring 4.23
176 x 176 bit multiplication 38.56
176 bit inverse 158.73
Table 7.2: Timings for various eld operations in GF ((216)11).
In analyzing this results, one has to take into account the fact that in our
implementation all operations were run on a DEC Alpha 3000, a 175 MHz RISC
processor with a 64-bit word size and that the coordinates of the elliptic curve points
that were doubled are in the eld GF ((216)11). Notice that one inversion time cor-
respond to 4.12 multiplication times. Using Table 7.1, we can readily predict that
the timings for the formulae presented in Theorems 13, 14 and 15 should outperform
the timings for the individual doublings. In addition, using the complexity shown
in Table 7.1 and the timings shown in Table 7.2 we can make estimates as to how
long a doubling operation will take using both formulae and individual doublings.
Table 7.3 summarizes the estimated times and compares them to the actual times
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that doublings take.
Calculation Method Predicted Timing Measured Timing % Improvement
Predicted Measured
8P Direct Doublings 748.41 sec 904.812 sec 0.30 12.5
Individual Doublings 750.78 sec 1.035 msec
16P Direct Doublings 978.62 sec 1.141 msec 2.24 17.85
Individual Doublings 1.001 msec 1.389 msec
32P Direct Doublings 1.191 msec 1.380 msec 4.80 22.08
Individual Doublings 1.251 msec 1.771 msec
Table 7.3: Timing comparison: Individual doublings vs. direct computation of several
doublings in GF ((216)11).
Two important observations are worth noticing:
 First, the average timings are always greater than the estimated timings, which
we attributed to the presence of overhead in the routines that implement the
algorithms (e.g., initialization of variables).
 Second, and more important than the rst observation, the average timings
imply that the formulae outperform the regular approach of doubling elliptic
curve points by much more than predicted.
7.2 Complexity Analysis of the k-ary Method
In this section, we perform an analysis of the k-ary method when it is used in con-
junction with the formulae presented in Theorems 12, 13, 14, and 15. In addition, we
compare the complexity of both approaches to the k-ary method, with and without
formulae. Finally, we derive an expression that predicts the theoretical improvement
of the k-ary method when applied with the formulae, in terms of the ratio between
inversion and multiplication times.
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7.2.1 k-ary Method Complexity
In Section 4.3, we noticed that the complexity of the k-ary method was:
#Additionsk−ary = 2k − 2 + t (7.9)
#Doublingsk−ary = kt (7.10)
where t+1 is the number of k-bit words in the multiplier e. If we consider a (l+1)-bit
multiplier, we can rewrite (7.9) and (7.10) as: (Notice t = d l+1
k
e − 1)
#Additionsk−ary = 2k +
&
l + 1
k
’
− 3 (7.11)
#Doublingsk−ary = k
 &
l + 1
k
’
− 1
!
(7.12)
Recall from Section 2.2.2 that both, point addition and doubling, require two
eld multiplications and one eld inversion (squarings and additions will not be taken
into account since they are almost for \free" when compared to multiplication and
inversion). Then, the number of multiplications and inversions in the k-ary method
are:
#Multiplicationsk−ary = 2(k + 1)
&
l + 1
k
’
+ 2k+1 − (6 + 2k) (7.13)
#Inversionsk−ary = (k + 1)
&
l + 1
k
’
+ 2k − (3 + k) (7.14)
For the specic case k = 4,which is the optimum choice for most elliptic curve systems,
(7.13) and (7.14) reduce to:
#Multiplicationsk−ary(k = 4) = 10
&
l + 1
4
’
+ 18 (7.15)
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#Inversionsk−ary(k = 4) = 5
&
l + 1
4
’
+ 9 (7.16)
7.2.2 Complexity of the k-ary Method with Formulae for
k = 4
In order to apply the formulae of Theorem 14, we substitute the double and add
algorithm in Step 3.1 by (7.5) and (7.6). Then, (7.11) and (7.12) become:
#Additionsk−ary = 2k +
&
l + 1
k
’
− 3 (7.17)
#Doubling Formulask−ary = t (7.18)
Recall from Theorem 14 that one needs 19 eld multiplications and one inverse
to perform four consecutive doublings with the formulae in (7.5) and (7.6). Then,
noticing that the complexity of a point addition operation has not changed, we nd:
#Multiplicationsk−ary with formulae(k = 4) = 21
&
l + 1
4
’
+ 7 (7.19)
#Inversionsk−ary with formulae(k = 4) = 2
&
l + 1
4
’
+ 12 (7.20)
7.2.3 Relative Improvement
In this section, we consider the special case in which l + 1 = 176, or in other words,
the case of a 176-bit multiplier. Notice that, k = 4 in all computations because
it was found to be the optimum value of k for this number of bits. The number of
multiplications and inversions needed for the k-ary method with and without formulas
are summarized in Table 7.4.
From Table 7.4 we derived expressions for the time it would take to perform
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Field Operation k-ary method k-ary method with formulae
#multiplications 458 931
#inversions 229 100
Table 7.4: Comparison of complexities required to perform the multiplication eP using
the regular k-ary method, k = 4, and the k-ary method with four direct doublings.
a whole point multiplication as:
TRegular method = 458tMULT + 229tINV (7.21)
TFormula method = 931tMULT + 100tINV (7.22)
where tMULT means the time required for one eld multiplication and tINV signies
the time required for one eld inversion. Notice that from (7.21) and (7.22) one can
readily derive the relative improvement by dening r = tINV =tMULT as:
Relative Improvement =
TRegular method −TFormula method
TRegular method
(7.23)
or using (7.21) and (7.22)
Relative Improvement =
129r − 473
229r + 458
< 56:3% (7.24)
Notice that the relative improvement for the ratio of the inversion time to the multi-
plication time in our implementation is:
Relative Improvement(r = 4:19) =
129(4:19) − 473
229(4:19) + 458
 100 = 13:5%
As will be shown in Section 7.4 the actual improvement is 17 percent which is in
accordance with the observation in Table 7.3.
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7.3 Complexity Analysis of the Improved k-ary Method
with Formulae for k = 5
In this section, we consider the improved k-ary method of exponentiation described
in Theorem 5. We develop a complexity analysis of this algorithm for the case k = 5
and nd specic values for a 176-bit multiplier.
By choosing k = 5, we limit the size of each word ei in the b-radix represen-
tation of the multiplier to 5 bits (see Theorem 5). This implies that there are 32
possible dierent values that each 5-bit word ei can attain. Furthermore, if one was
to divide the ei words into subgroups based on the value of hi and 5− hi (as dened
in Theorem 5) one would nd the distribution found in Table 7.5. Notice that the
values of hi will determine the number of doublings performed in a given iteration of
the improved k-ary method for exponentiation.
hi 5− hi Frequency
0 5 17
1 4 8
2 3 4
3 2 2
4 1 1
Table 7.5: Frequency of occurrence for possible hi and 5− hi values.
As in Section 7.2, we will limit our complexity analysis to multiplications and
inversions since additions and squarings are \cheap" when compared to the other eld
operations. Notice, then that depending on the value of hi, one will have to perform
ve doublings (D5), four doublings (D4), three doublings (D3), two doublings (D2), or
one doubling (D1). Table 7.6 shows a summary of the complexity of these operations.
It is important to point out that since the formulae presented in Theorems 12, 13, 14,
and 15 are only more ecient than the double and add algorithm for three, four, or
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ve doublings, these are the only formulae that will be used. The standard doubling
formula for elliptic curves from (2.4) and (2.5) will be used in the remainder of the
cases.
Method of Doubling # of Doublings # Mult. # Inv.
Regular Method D1 2 1
D2 4 2
Formulae Method D3 14 1
D4 19 1
D5 24 1
Table 7.6: Complexity of Doubling Approach.
From Theorem 5, we know that there 24 − 1 additions and one doubling due
to precomputation, and t additions, t(hi + (5 − hi)) doubling steps (why we write
the number of doublings in this way rather than 5t will become apparent later) for
iterations t− 1 to 0, and a variable number of operations in the rst iteration of the
algorithm, depending on the number of signicant bits in the most signicant word
of the multiplier.
Now, we specialize our analysis to the case in which we have a l + 1 = 176
bit multiplier. In this case, the algorithm will go through t + 1 = d(l + 1)=5e = 36
iterations. Then, we can nd the complexity of the precomputations as follows:
(Notice that as before one point addition takes two multiplications and one inversion)
#Multiplicationsprecom = 2 + 15(2) = 32
#Inversionsprecom = 1 + 15 = 16
The complexity of the precomputation is found by noticing that the most signicant
word of the base-32 representation of the multiplier can have at most two bits (in
general there will be at most 2d(l+1)=kek−(l+1) bits). Therefore, we have the complexity
shown in Table 7.7.
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Bit Pattern Doublings Table Look-ups
00 0 0 (go to next word)
01 0 1
10 1 1
11 0 1
Table 7.7: Number of Operation for Bit Patterns of the Most Signicant Word of the
Multiplier.
Since table look-ups are essentially for free and assuming that every bit pattern
has the same probability, we will have that an average of 0:25 2 = 0:5 multiplications
and 0:25  1 = 0:25 inversions from the rst iteration of the algorithm. For the re-
maining t iterations we will have the following average number of operations: (Notice
that D1, D2, D2, D3, D4, and D5 are as dened in Table 7.6)
Avg. # operations =

17
32
D5 +
1
32
(D4 +D1) +
2
32
(D3 +D4)+)
(
4
32
(D2 +D3) +
8
32
(D1 +D4)

t
Substituting the corresponding number of multiplications and inversions in for D1,
D2, D2, D3, D4, and D5, we get:
#Multiplicationsdoubling =
24675
32
= 771:09
#Inversionsdoubling =
1855
32
= 57:97
The number of additions is just equal to t or 35 additions. Notice that there is a 1/32
chance that ei = 0, in which case there would not be an addition, thus in terms of
the eld operations we have that 35 additions contribute:
#Multiplicationsadditions = 2
31
32
35 = 67:81
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#Inversionsadditions =
31
32
35 = 33:91
Thus, adding up the partial complexities, we nd that the improved k-ary method
for exponentiation with a 176-bit multiplier and k = 5, will require on average:
#Multiplicationsimproved k−ary = 871:41 (7.25)
#Inversionsimproved k−ary = 108:13 (7.26)
Comparing (7.25) and (7.26) to the results presented in Table 7.4, it can be seen
that the number of multiplications decreases by about 60 at the cost of about 8 extra
inversions. Assuming that one inversion time is 4.19 multiplication times, one nds
that the improvement from the k-ary method with formulae to the improved k-ary
method with formulae is on average about 25.55 multiplication times or on a DEC
Alpha with a 175 MHz clock frequency, 985 sec.
7.4 Application to Point Multiplication
This section describes the application of the various algorithms to an actual EC
system over the eld GF (216)11) = GF (2176). First we investigate multiplication of
a point which is the core operation in a Die-Hellman key exchange or a digital
signature generation. We compare the timings obtained for dierent parameters k in
the k-ary method and the improved k-ary method with and without the new formulae
of Section 7.1. We also present the timings for several arithmetic operations in the
composite eld GF ((216)11) and the timings for several algorithms used to compute
nP where n is a long integer (176 bits) and P is a point on the elliptic curve as
described in (2.3). The DEC Alpha 3000, a 175 MHz RISC architecture with a 64
bit word size was used to perform all measurements. In some cases timings on a
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DEC Alpha with a clock frequency of 233 MHz will also be provided as a measure of
comparison.
Method Window Size k Average Timing (in msec)
k-ary 3 87
4 84
5 88
k-ary with formulae 4 68
Table 7.8: Comparison of average time required to perform the nP calculation in
GF ((216)11) using the regular k-ary method and the k-ary method with four direct
doublings using a DEC Alpha with 175 MHz clock frequency.
After several measurements, it was found that the optimum value for the
window size in the k-ary method was k = 4. Table 7.8 presents these results. It is
easy to see that by implementing the k-ary method with the formulas of Section 7.1,
one can achieve speed-ups of up to 17 percent. Notice that the optimum value of k is
still influenced by the number of additions that are needed to pre-compute the table
used in the k-ary method as described in Theorem 4.
Operations Method/ Avg. Timing Avg. Timing
Type of Operation (175 MHz) (233 MHz)
Basic Field Operations 176 x 176 bit multiplication 38.6 sec 29.9 sec
176 bit inverse 158.7 sec 115.7 sec
Multiply new elliptic Double and Add Algorithm 92.7 msec 64.6 msec
curve point (n! 176 bits) k-ary method (k = 4) 82.7 msec 61.7 msec
k-ary method with formulae (k = 4) 68.3 msec 49.2 msec
Improved k-ary (k = 5) 75.8 msec 58.3 msec
Improved k-ary with formulae (k = 5) 69.3 msec 50.4 msec
Multiply known elliptic Brickell’s Algorithm (base = 24 = 16) 19.7 msec 13.4 msec
curve point (n! 176 bits)
Table 7.9: Timings for various eld and elliptic curve operations.
Table 7.9 presents the timings for various arithmetic operations and for sev-
eral algorithms used to compute nP . Notice also that the last entry of Table 7.9
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corresponds to the nP calculation when the point P is known ahead of time, thus it
is possible to pre-compute a table of multiples of P . This implies that the formulae
derived in Section 7.1 were not used in this algorithm. Finally, that the timings of
Table 7.9 do not show any timing improvement due to the use of the improved k-ary
method contrary to the predictions made in Section 7.3. In fact the timings indicate
that the improved k-method with formulae is slower than the k-ary method with for-
mulae. This can be explained by the fact that in the k-ary method one only realizes
doublings with the formulae while in the improved k-ary method you need to use the
double and add algorithm in some cases since the formulae are not eective for small
numbers of doublings (1 or 2). This inclusion of the double and add algorithm will
create overhead which eventually will make the improved k-ary method slower than
the k-ary method.
Chapter 8
Elliptic Curve Key Exchange
Protocols
This chapter is based on the discussion in [Bea96, Chapter 5]. This chapter intro-
duces several elliptic curve based cryptosystems. An analog of the Die-Hellman key
exchange protocol will be presented as well as other systems whose one-way functions
have been replaced by elliptic curves. Finally, we provide timing estimates for a soft-
ware implementation of the elliptic curve analog of the Die-Hellman key exchange
protocol.
8.1 Elliptic Curve Analog to Die-Hellman Key
Exchange
The Die-Hellman key exchange algorithm can easily be implemented using elliptic
curves. Let’s suppose that Alice and Bob want to agree upon a key which will later
be used in conjunction with a private-key cryptosystem. They rst publicly choose
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an elliptic curve E over a nite eld GF (2k). Each of their keys will be constructed
using a point  2 E(GF (2k)) which they have randomly chosen and made public.
Point  is the generator of a cyclic subgroup of E, and the group order should be of
the same magnitude as GF (2k).
AB
ABK      = u BetaB
Compute Beta B
Beta     = v alphaB
Compute Shared Key KAB
Alice Bob
Compute Shared Key K
Choose a secret random
AB
          = (uv)alpha
          = u (v alpha)
Choose a secret random
          = (uv)alpha
          = v (u alpha)
Beta
Beta
A
B
parameter u, 0 < u < #E
Compute BetaA
Beta    = u*alphaA
parameter v, 0 < v < #E
K       = v BetaA
Figure 8.1: Elliptic curve key exchange protocol
Alice and Bob now have the same key Kuv = u v  2 E. Security is gained
by the intractability of nding point Kuv. Notice that without solving the elliptic
curve discrete logarithm problem, which is dened as follows:
Given: ;  2 E such that:  = n;where n is an integer.
Determine: n:
there seems to be no ecient way to compute u v  knowing only u and v .
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8.2 Proposed IEEE Standard
The next cryptosystem that will be described is a draft of a proposed IEEE Standard
[MQV95]. Changes may occur in the design of such a system, since it is still in the
working stages.
This system is designed to be an analog to the ElGamal public-key cryptosys-
tem. However, unlike the previous system discussed, this system does not contain the
same drawbacks that were previously mentioned. The idea behind this proposal, is to
standardize a method, which is secure, and at the same time able to be implemented
in software and hardware at reasonable speeds.
This method, like the others we discussed, has the same system setup. An
elliptic curve E dened over a nite eld GF (q) is chosen. A point P with order n is
then selected. These values are all public information.
Again, generating the public and private keys is similar to the methods already
discussed. For the following discussion: Bob is sending a message M to Alice.
Key Generation
1. Select a random integer d in the range f1! n− 1g.
2. Compute the point Q := dP .
3. The entity’s public key is the point Q.
4. The entity’s private key is the integer d.
Encryption Process
1. Bob gets Alice’s public key: Q.
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2. The message M is represented as a pair of eld elements (m1;m2), m1 2 GF (q),
m2 2 GF (q).
3. Select a random integer k in the range f1! n − 1g.
4. Compute the point (x1; y1) := kP .
5. Compute the point (x2; y2) := kQ.
6. The eld elements m1; m2, and x2 are combined in a predetermined manner to
obtain the two eld elements c1 and c2. (Discussed below)
7. Transmit the data c := (x1; y1; c1; c2) to Alice.
Decryption Process
1. Compute the point (x2; y2) := d(x1; y1), using its private key d.
2. Recover the message m1 and m2 from c1, c2, and x2.
What makes this method more secure than the one discussed earlier, is the way
that the eld elementsm1; m2, and x2 are combined. They are combined in a manner
in which an intruder who knows c1, c2 and half the message, say m1, cannot recover
the second half of the message m2, nor will he be able to substitute m1 by another
message m
0
1 of his choice. The following method is used to encrypt the message and
form the eld elements c1; c2:
1. Form the eld element x3 by setting to 0 the most signicant bit of x2.
2. Compute the eld element x32.
3. Form the eld element y3 by setting to 0 the most signicant bit of x32.
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4. Form the eld element x4 by concatenating the most signicant bits of x3 fol-
lowed by the least signicant bits of y3.
5. Form the eld element y4 by concatenating the most signicant bits of y3 fol-
lowed by the least signicant bits of x3.
6. Compute z1 := m1  y3 and z2 := m2  x3, where  is bitwise XOR.
7. Perform eld multiplications to get c1 := x4  z1 and c2 := y4  z2.
Message expansion can be reduced to about 3=2 if we represent point P by its
x-coordinate and one bit of y1. We can do this using the method that is outlined in
the appendix.
8.3 Performance Analysis
In this section, we provide a comparison between the speeds that elliptic curve cryp-
tosystems can attain and the speeds of other algorithms such as the Die-Hellman
key exchange over prime elds. It is assume that both algorithms are run on a DEC
Alpha 3000 with a 175 MHz clock frequency. Finally it is important to point out
that the Die-Hellman key exchange times over prime elds are not estimates but
rather the timings reported in [Bea96]. The elliptic curve key-exchange algorithm
DH 512 DH 1024 EC 176
Key exchange times 1.16sec 8.62sec 88 msec
Table 8.1: Time comparison for key-exchange algorithms: Modulo arithmetic vs.
elliptic curves over the eld GF ((216)11).
outperforms the Die-Hellman algorithm for both the 512 and 1024 bit modulus. It
is important to point out that the times reported in Table 8.1 are average times, since
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each key exchange will depend on the specic exponent used. Finally, notice that the
elliptic curve that was used provide the same level of security as a Die-Hellman key
exchange with 1200 bits, thus, the time improvement that is obtained with elliptic
curves is even more dramatic.
Chapter 9
Discussion
This section will summarize the results that were obtained throughout the research
work that culminated with this thesis. A summary of the chapters and their main
results will be provided as well as some recommendations for future research.
9.1 Conclusions
This research has demonstrated that elliptic curve cryptosystems are well suited for
cryptographic applications and can be used in practical applications. Furthermore,
elliptic curve cryptosystems are a logical alternative to other systems based in DL
problem over nite elds because of their security and their eciency derived from
their short key lengths. Three algorithms were developed which can be used to con-
struct cryptosystems that outperform existing systems today. The main achievements
of this research included:
 Demonstrated an ecient implementation of the multiplication operation in the
composite eld GF ((216)11) that outperforms by ten percent a straightforward
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approach. This was achieved by optimizing and analyzing the Karatsuba-Ofman
algorithm for multiplication in composite elds for software implementations.
 Demonstrated an ecient implementation of the Itoh and Tsujii’s algorithm for
computing inverses in composite elds in standard base representation which
had been initially tailored for Galois elds in normal base representation.
 Developed a totally new approach for point multiplication, the core operation
in the Die-Hellman key exchange protocol and the generation of digital signa-
tures. This approached proved to provide our implementation with a 17 percent
improvement over the standard k-ary method for exponentiation.
 The software implementation achieved a time of 49.21 msec in a DEC Alpha
with a 233 MHz clock frequency for performing a whole elliptic curve point
multiplication, which is essentially the time needed for a Die-Hellman key
exchange or signature generation.
 Provided time estimates for an elliptic curve key-exchange protocol that outper-
forms the Die-Hellman key exchange algorithm based on modulo-p arithmetic
with 1024 bits by a factor of almost 100.
9.2 Recommendations for Further Research
This section will provide the reader with an overview of the possible areas in which
further work could be pursued. Many of the ideas have come up as a result of
this research and provide opportunities to investigate further the possibilities of the
algorithms that were developed in this thesis.
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9.2.1 Generalization of the Improved Point Multiplication
Chapter 7 explored a new approach for point doubling in non-supersingular elliptic
curves over elds of characteristic 2. It would be interesting to explore the benets
of this idea as applied to curves over elds of characteristic 3, prime elds, and for
supersingular and hyperelliptic curves. Also, from a theoretical point of view, it
would be nice if general formulas for the computation of a multiple of a point could
be derived so as to provided a formula for any point Qk = 2kP in terms of the previous
formula for Qk−1 = 2k−1P .
9.2.2 Implementation of a Variant of the Improved k-ary
Method
It was found in Chapter 7 that the improved k-ary method did not outperform the k-
ary method. On possible solution would be to derive further formulas for 6,7,8,9,and
10 doublings in a row and allow for more doublings in each iteration of the algorithm
without altering the value of k that was found to be optimum.
9.2.3 Implementation of the Sliding Window Method for Ex-
ponentiation
The sliding window method for exponentiation, it is a generalization of the k-ary and
improved k-ary methods which uses variable values for k, known as the window size.
A possible project would be to explore this algorithm and the feasibility of applying
the doubling formulas to it.
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9.2.4 Implementation of a Dierent Inversion Algorithm
It was found in Chapter 6 that the exponentiation algorithm that was used in our
implementation was not the most ecient one. Thus, it would be necessary to im-
plement the algorithms that were suggested in [WBV+96] for inversion in composite
elds.
Appendix A
Proofs for Doubling Formulas
A.1 Proof for Theorem 13
In the following, we will derive Theorem 13. We assume that we have obtained
(7.1) and (7.2) to calculate 22P = (x2; y2) and that we are trying to nd similar
expressions for 23P = (x3; y3). In addition, we keep the notation of Theorem 12 in
which γ = x2, = γ + y,  = 2 + x+ aγ,  = x+ γ, and  = ( + ) + γ2γ, and
P = (x; y).
Then, by writing (2.4) and (2.5) in terms of x2, y2, x3, and y3, one nds:
x3 =
(x22 + y2)
2 + (x22 + y2)x2 + ax
2
2
x22
y3 =
x22x2 + (x
2
2 + y2)x3
x2
+ x3
Next we consider the term x22 + y2 by plugging in (7.1) and (7.2) for x2 and y2,
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respectively. Then, if we let  = γ and  = 2 +  +  2a, we get:
x22 + y2 =
2 +  +  24 +  2
 4
Plugging this expression into the expression for x3, we get:
x3 =
h
2++24+2
4
i2
+
h
2++24+2
4
i 

2

2
4
+ a
Letting  =  2 and ! = (+)+(2)2 + and simplifying we immediately
obtain (7.3). Notice that (7.4) is also easily obtained by rst substituting x2 =

2
and plugging this expression into the equation for y3 to obtain:
y3 =


2


2
+ !
4
x3

2
+ x3
which after simplication yields (7.4).2
A.2 Proof for Theorem 14
In the following, we will derive Theorem 14. We assume that we have obtained
(7.3) and (7.4) to calculate 23P = (x3; y3) and that we are trying to nd similar
expressions for 24P = (x4; y4). In addition, we keep the notation of Theorem 13 in
which γ = x2, = γ + y,  = 2 + x+ aγ,  = x + γ,  = ( + ) + γ2γ, = γ,
 = 2 +  +  2a,  =  2, ! = ( +  ) + (2)2 + , and P = (x; y).
Then, by writing (2.4) and (2.5) in terms of x3, y3, x4, and y4, one nds:
x4 =
(x23 + y3)
2 + (x23 + y3)x3 + ax
2
3
x23
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y4 =
x23x3 + (x
2
3 + y3)x4
x3
+ x4
Next we use (7.3) and (7.4) and consider the term x23 + y3. Thus, we get:
x23 + y3 =
(!2 + ! + 2a)2
4
+
42 + !(!2 + !+ 2a) + 2(!2 + ! + 2a)
4
Letting  = !2 + ! + 2a and  = ( + (! + )) + (2)2, we get:
x3 =

2
and
x23 + y3 =

4
Plugging this expression into the equation for x4, we get
x4 =


4
2
+ 
4

2

2
2 + a
which after simplifying turns into (7.5). Similarly, we write y4 in terms of x3 and y3
as
y5 =


2
2  
2

+ 
4
x4

2
+ x4
Simplifying, we get (7.6).2
A.3 Proof for Theorem 15
In the following, we will derive Theorem 15. We assume that we have obtained
(7.5) and (7.6) to calculate 24P = (x4; y4) and that we are trying to nd similar
expressions for 25P = (x5; y5). In addition, we keep the notation of Theorem 15 in
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which γ = x2, = γ + y,  = 2 + x+ aγ,  = x + γ,  = ( + ) + γ2γ, = γ,
 = 2 +  +  2a,  =  2, ! = ( +  ) + (2)2 + ,  = !2 + ! + a2,
 = 2 + (!) + 2 + (2)2, and P = (x; y).
We then re-write (2.4) and (2.5) in terms of x4, y4, x5, and y5 as:
x5 =
(x24 + y4)
2 + (x24 + y4)x4 + ax
2
4
x24
y5 =
x24x4 + (x
2
4 + y4)x5
x4
+ x5
Next, consider the term x24 + y4 and use (7.5). Using(7.6) for x4 and y4, we
nd:
x24+y4 =
(2 + 2 + a(2)2)
2
(2)4
+

(2)2 + (2)
(2+2+a(2)2)
(2)2

(2)2
+
(2 + 2 + a(2)2)
(2)2
Letting  = 2,  = 2 + + a2, and  = ( + + 2) + 2(2)2, one obtains:
x24 + y4 =

(2)2
Then:
x5 =


(2)2
2
+ 
(2)2

2
2
4
+ a
which readily simplies into (7.7). In a similar manner, we obtain:
y5 =


2
2 
2
+ 
(2)2
x5

2
+ x5
which turns into (7.8) after simplication.2
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